Thursday, January 21, 2021

Filip Kovacevic: The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s - What KGB Counterintelligence Knew (1)

Blog Series: Reading Secret Journals of the KGB

Title: Toward the Question of the Detection of the Activities of Chinese Intelligence Services Using the Legal Cover on the Territory of the USSR

Author: Captain N. S. Kuznetsov

Publication: Volume 21, Papers of the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB, Moscow, 1980, pages 203-216. Classified as Top Secret.

Article Analysis by Filip Kovacevic, PhD

Written by KGB counterintelligence officer N. S. Kuznetsov, this article presents the KGB’s Second Main Directorate (Counterintelligence) insights about the operations of the legal officers of Chinese intelligence agencies in the USSR in the 1970s. The article has never been officially declassified by the Russian government and is analyzed here in English for the first time.

Kuznetsov begins by referring to the 1975 speech of the KGB chairman Yury Andropov who stated that the subversive activities of Chinese intelligence in the USSR represented a threat to state security. Accordingly, Kuznetsov refers to China as the “adversary” throughout the article. (Note that, at the same time, the United States was referred to as the “main adversary”).

Kuznetsov focuses on the Chinese intelligence officers who operate under the diplomatic cover. According to him, these officers are based at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, the headquarters of the Chinese state news agency “Xinhua,” and the Chinese civil aviation office at the Moscow Sheremetyevo airport, which was located in the Siberian city of Irkutsk until 1974. In addition, Chinese intelligence also has its personnel in the trade and border guard delegations in the border towns of Zabaikalsk and Grodekovo as well as on the Beijing-Moscow railway line. However, Kuznetsov stresses that the main controlling post of Chinese espionage in the USSR is the Chinese Embassy, which houses both the officers of the Chinese state security & foreign intelligence service and the Chinese military intelligence service.

Kuznetsov characterizes the Chinese intelligence officers as extremely cautious and circumspect in their dealings with Soviet citizens. He states that they are well-trained in Russian language and often successful in avoiding KGB surveillance. According to Kuznetsov, their favorite recruitment opportunities are the diplomatic events and parties organized by the Chinese Embassy. He notes that, in the period from 1972 to 1976, the Chinese Embassy organized more than 60 events with the participation of about 2,500 foreign citizens, 1,000 Soviet citizens, and 400 Chinese permanent residents in the Soviet Union. The Chinese permanent residents as well as other members of the ethnic Chinese community in the USSR (Kuznetsov estimates their number at 250,000) have traditionally represented the largest pool of recruits for Chinese intelligence. However, he emphasizes that the recruitment only takes place after a lengthy process of checks and controls, including the unannounced visits to the places of residence, and typically takes years.

Kuznetsov enumerates the following signs that the Chinese intelligence has begun paying attention to a particular Chinese permanent resident living in the USSR: frequent invitations to the Embassy events, always being received by the same Embassy official, gifts (national souvenirs, small amounts of money), and inquiries about him or her via other channels. He states that while it is possible for the KGB to dangle its undercover agent from the Chinese community for recruitment, it requires an air-tight cover story, including real-life family connections to China. The KGB agent must also be ready for extensive questioning by Chinese intelligence officers. Kuznetsov also warns that Chinese intelligence officers are very suspicious of all volunteers.

According to Kuznetsov, the most effective way to infiltrate a KGB agent into the Chinese espionage network in the USSR is to use the existing KGB agents among the non-Soviet diplomats and journalists from the developing and even “capitalist” countries. He emphasizes that the Chinese intelligence officers have shown themselves to be very active in trying to recruit from this group, in addition to recruiting from the Chinese immigrant community. He also notes that the partner counterintelligence services of Mongolia and East Germany have come to the same conclusion.

In addition, no matter how guarded and cautious the Chinese Embassy officials appear to be, Kuznetsov notes that the KGB counterintelligence is on a constant lookout for their potential moral failings and compromising behavior. For instance, he chronicles a visit of two Chinese diplomats known only under the initials Ch. and M. to Irkutsk in 1969 when one of them behaved immorally (he leaves out the specifics of what the official did). In addition, Kuznetsov mentions that some Chinese trade officials visiting the border town of Grodekovo were observed by the KGB agents stealing money and souvenirs from each other. He underscores that these and similar situations can be used as counterintelligence recruitment tools.

Kuznetsov describes several actual cases of the Chinese recruitment of Soviet citizens. The first case is that of the Chinese language translator codenamed “Monk” trying to recruit the Soviet translator codenamed “Mole” (not very creative code name, I know). “Mole” worked as a translator in the Chita region from 1954 until 1961 and was demoted for alcoholism. His career failure was used as a recruitment tool by the Chinese intelligence. In the period from 1972 to 1974, “Mole” was asked to supply the Chinese with classified information about Soviet military and industrial infrastructure and was promised monetary gifts and even exfiltration to China. Obviously, “Mole” operated until the control of the KGB and was giving the Chinese intelligence useless or misdirecting information.

The second case described by Kuznetsov is that of the airport official codenamed “Rogov” whose recruitment was attempted while the Chinese civil aviation office was still located in Irkutsk. “Rogov” was being checked and re-checked by the Chinese for two years while being asked to read Maoist political pamphlets and discuss them with his handlers. He was also asked to write an anti-Soviet article for the Chinese newspaper. Just like “Mole,” he too was under the control of the KGB.

Kuznetsov also discusses the case of the Chinese spy known only under the initial Ch. Ch. came to one of the regional KGB headquarters in 1975 and voluntarily confessed that he was spying for China. Already a permanent resident, Ch. stated that he was recruited by the Chinese intelligence before his arrival to the USSR and began spying in 1961. For more than a decade, he performed secret assignments by the intelligence personnel based at the Chinese Embassy. He stated that he would typically meet with them in the Embassy car or he would be covertly driven into the Embassy compound. Ch. also said that, if needed, he would communicate with the Chinese intelligence officers via phone using coded messages. Kuznetsov does not indicate anything about Ch.’s ultimate fate. It seems likely that Ch. was turned into a double agent and may still have been operating when the article was written.

In conclusion, Kuznetsov admits that the issue of Chinese espionage in the USSR is a complex one and calls for the compilation of all available data (historical and operative) in one place in order to create a general model of Chinese intelligence activities. He claims that the existence of such a model would not only allow the KGB counterintelligence to avoid mistakes in planning its operations but would also make it possible to deal “pre-emptive blows” to the Chinese intelligence services, if and when necessary.

As we can see, the animosity between the Soviet and Chinese intelligence services was running high in the 1970s. The KGB counterintelligence seems to have had notable successes and yet, at the same time, it exhibited a degree of insecurity making it seem as if the Chinese were able to gain some hard to define, but tangible advantage in the spy war. Kuznetsov tries to sound hopeful, but there is hidden anxiety subsumed in his narrative.