Filip Kovacevic: TOP SECRET: Traces from KGB Files 1-4

Traces from KGB Files 1 (Alfred Svenson)

The story of Captain Alfred Svenson, the only commissioned U.S. Army officer to defect to the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, is well-known.

What is not well-known, if at all, is that there is a report about him in the Lithuanian KGB Files (Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 376, pp. 106-107, Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution).

The report is hand-written and was produced at the request of the 2nd Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB (counterintelligence) in connection to a surveillance operation run by the KGB branch in Kaunas. The surveillance operation involved the clandestine opening of a letter sent from the U.S. to Kaunas. The letter was a private communication between two sisters and made a reference to "Nina's son" who fled from "our side" to "your side."

Upon further inquiry, the Lithuanian KGB discovered that "Nina's son" was none other than Alfred Svenson, born in Kaunas to Russian parents in 1932. His mother Nina married a Swedish citizen Svenson upon the death of her husband Serdiukov and together with her son left Lithuania for Germany. She immigrated from Germany to the U.S. in 1949 and the two sisters must have known her personally when she lived in Kaunas.

The report on Svenson gave a short presentation of his anti-American propaganda activities in East Germany, repeating his claim from the press conference on September 30, 1963, that he left the U.S. for political reasons and did not plan to return. In reality, however, he was expelled by East Germany less than a year later and was then court-marshalled and sentenced to seven years of prison. There was insufficient evidence to convict him of espionage, however.

The previously unknown information that emerges from the report is that the Lithuanian KGB sent an agent under journalistic cover to interview Svenson in East Berlin. The agent reported that Svenson expressed an interest in visiting Lithuania and was awaiting an official invitation from the Lithuanian authorities.

The invitation never came which indicates that, notwithstanding his defection and public declarations of anti-Americanism, Svenson was never trusted by the KGB. This perhaps also explains his rather rapid and unceremonious expulsion from East Germany.

Traces from KGB Files 2 (Harold Gibson)

Harold Gibson (1897-1960) was a long-time British intelligence officer whose career spanned from the late 1910s to the late 1950s and was rooted primarily in Eastern Europe. Gibson's career is discussed in Nigel West's book The Friends, Keith Jeffrey's official history of the MI6, as well as by several other scholars more recently. The enduring question is whether Gibson recruited a high-ranking agent in the Kremlin in the 1930s and if so, who this person was.

There is a mention of another alleged Gibson's agent in the Lithuanian KGB files (Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 376, pp. 102-104, Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution). This agent was not based in the Soviet Union but in Czechoslovakia.

The story begins in Kaunas where the former general of the Lithuanian Air Force Iozas Kraucevičius was living under the KGB surveillance after his release from the GULAG following Stalin's death. Born in 1879, Kraucevičius started out his military career in the Russian Tsarist Army and fought against the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War. After Lithuania's independence, he quickly rose in the ranks but, in the late 1920s, due to the allegations of mismanagement, left the military to become the main Lithuanian contact for the Czechoslovak military-industrial giant Škoda. It was in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s that, according to the KGB, Kraucevičius befriended a person who was an alleged agent of Harold Gibson.

The Lithuanian KGB report dated April 14, 1964, identified Gibson's Czech agent as Yaroslav Kraichi, a former Škoda engineer born in 1891 and employed in the Prague export company "Investa." The report stated that, in the 1950s, Kraichi was monitored by Czechoslovak state security as a suspected British intelligence agent and was known to use secret writing in his correspondence with other suspected agents.

The Lithuanian KGB claimed to have evidence that Kraichi kept in contact with Kraucevičius until 1956. For instance, in 1955, Kraichi sent two packages addressed to Kraucevičius's wife and the Lithuanian KGB alleged that she had corresponded with him using a fictitious address.

In February 1957, a Lithuanian KGB agent codenamed BALT obtained an introduction letter from Kraucevičius and traveled to Czechoslovakia under the cover of a tourist to meet with Kraichi. During this meeting, Kraichi told BALT that Kraucevičius had two active bank accounts, one in Prague and another in London. In Prague, he had 90,000 korunas ($160,000 today) and in London, 500 pounds ($23,000 today). One can imagine the surprise of BALT's KGB handlers when they heard about the existence of this money. The report, however, remained silent on the fate of the money. It just noted that, on parting, Kraichi gave BALT a golden cigarette case and a golden ring as gifts for Kraucevičius.

Though Kraichi was described as Gibson's agent, the Lithuanian KGB report did not make a similar allegation about Kraucevičius. Was he also a member of the Gibson network? Having money in a foreign bank account and a suspected foreign agent acting as an accountant would definitely raise a lot of red flags. And yet, the Lithuanian KGB said nothing.

Typically, the Lithuanian KGB would be not so circumspect in declaring somebody a foreign agent. The fact that by April 1964, Kraucevičius was already dead could hardly be an explanation. There must have been other reasons for their reticence, perhaps too compartmented to be revealed in this particular report.

Traces from KGB Files 3 (Henrik Birnbaum)

On February 19, 1965, Major Udodov, deputy head of the 6th Department of the Second Chief Directorate (KGB counterintelligence), sent a classified letter to Colonel Obukauskas, head of the Second Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB, in Vilnius. The 6th Department of the SCD was tasked with counterintelligence measures targeting short-term foreign visitors to the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, a well-known KGB defector Yuri Nosenko was employed there. 

Udodov’s letter concerned the January 1965 visit by a UCLA professor Henrik Birnbaum (1925-2002), a distinguished scholar of Slavic languages, who had arrived in the Soviet Union from Sweden. Udodov described Birnbaum as an instructor in the UCLA “so-called Slavic School” which, according to him, was “used by U.S. intelligence to train its personnel.” 

Udodov informed Obukauskas that after what must have been a clandestine search of Birnbaum’s effects, a note containing the name and street address of a Lithuanian woman was found. She was Veronika Alsenkiene residing in Kaunas. Udodov wanted Obukauskas to send him information on Alsenkiene and explain the nature of her relations with Birnbaum.

Obukauskas passed on the letter to his subordinate Lieutenant Colonel Naras, the head of the 1st Department of the Second Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB. On March 5, 1965, Naras wrote back to Udodov, correcting him in that the last name of the woman in question was Alseikene, and not Alsenkiene, and informing him that she was a retired medical doctor who had a private practice in Kaunas. What was significant from the counterintelligence point of view was that her daughter Marija Gimbut [Gimbutas] (1921-1994) left Lithuania in 1944 and, after studying at the Universities of Vienna, Innsbruck, and Tubingen, immigrated to the U.S. in 1949. She worked as an archeologist at UCLA, the same university as Birnbaum. 

Naras added that Gimbut’s relations with Birnbaum were known to the Lithuanian counterintelligence implying that both were the persons of interest but did not elaborate further. This reply must have satisfied Udodov because there was no more correspondence on this matter at this particular time. 

The existence of this correspondence indicates that Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence maintained files on both Birnbaum and Gimbutas and that, in general, U.S. academics visiting the Soviet Union were subjected to clandestine but intrusive counterintelligence measures. 

Reference: Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 376, pp. 113-117, Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution. 

Traces from KGB Files 4 (John Massey Stewart)

Documents from the Lithuanian KGB reveal that KGB counterintelligence suspected a well-known British author and Russia specialist John Massey Stewart (1932-2023) of working for British intelligence. 

In 1969, Massey Stewart published a popular travelogue about his 1961 trip across the Soviet Union, from Leningrad to Vladivostok, in a Mini Minor from the British Motor Corporation. His car drew large crowds of curious Soviet citizens and no doubt infuriated the KGB. As a result, all his contacts in the Soviet Union were perceived as security threats to the Soviet state and subjected to an intrusive surveillance regime. A young Jewish girl from Kaunas named Yarieta Krakinovskite appears to have been one of them.

On March 3, 1965, a top ranking Soviet counterintelligence officer, Colonel Sergei Fedoseev, deputy head of the Second Chief Directorate’s Service No. 2, the newly established analytical branch of KGB counterintelligence, sent a top secret letter to Colonel Yuozas Obukauskas, the head of the Second Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB in Vilnius. In the early 1960s, Fedoseev had directed a large-scale KGB operation against the illegal currency trade in Moscow, which resulted in the notorious Currency Dealers Case.   

In his letter, Fedoseev informed Obukauskas that the 6th Department of the Operational-Technical Directorate (OTD), tasked with the interception and inspection of Soviet citizens’ mail, established the fact of correspondence between a British citizen John Massey Stewart, described as suspected of working for British intelligence, and Yarita Krakinovskaya [sic] in Kaunas. Fedoseev asked Obukauskas to initiate the assessment of Krakinovskaya and report on the character of her relations with Massey Stewart.

There is no doubt that Fedoseyev was unpleasantly surprised when he learned from Obukauskas that Yarieta (not Yarita) was no well-connected state employee with access to official secrets but an 18-year-old girl who recently graduated from high school. 

However, the Lithuanian KGB still suspected that there was more to this correspondence than met the eye. After receiving a detailed report from Major Henrikas Vaigauskas, a top ranking officer in the Kaunas branch of the KGB, Obukauskas informed Fedoseev that Yarieta’s parents had a relative living in New York City named Yevgeniya Cherkasskaya who worked as a manager of theatrical performances. 

According to the information the Kaunas KGB branch received from the KGB branch in the town of Yalta, Cherkasskaya spent almost three weeks in the Crimea in August 1963. She invited her relatives, Yarieta’s parents, to come from Kaunas and meet with her in Yalta. The KGB suspected Cherkasskaya of links to (unnamed) intelligence agencies and alleged that she was given an assignment by Massey Stewart to assess two individuals he had gotten to know on his 1961 trip. These two individuals had been planted in Massey Stewart’s company as KGB agents/informers codenamed KOMAROV and VALENTINA. 

Cherkasskaya met with KOMAROV and VALENTINA several times while she was in Yalta. However, even though the Yalta KGB branch placed Cherkasskaya under both physical and technical surveillance, they could find nothing to link her to any illegal or anti-Soviet activities.

In a move that appeared to baffle the Yalta KGB branch, Cherkasskaya not only did not hide her acquaintance with the KGB agents, but she even introduced them to her relatives from Kaunas and invited them to have dinner together. Moreover, the letters exchanged between Cherkasskaya and her relatives upon her return to New York City, intercepted and thoroughly inspected by the Lithuanian KGB, contained nothing except trivial everyday matters. 

After receiving Obukauskas’s reply, Fedoseev must have realized that there was nothing in Lithuania to compromise Massey Stewart. He did not write to Obukauskas about this matter again.  

Reference: Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 376, pp. 193-199, Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution.       

Interview with Dr. Filip Kovacevic

This interview was included in the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) Monthly Interview Series.  

Interview Introduction: Known as one of the world’s leading research scholars in Russian and Soviet intelligence history, we are very honored to have Dr. Kovacevic in this month’s Intelligence Education Interview Series. In this compelling interview, Dr. Kovacevic discusses his professional and academic path providing insight into his expertise and journey of documenting Russian and Soviet Intelligence history, and his latest works including the article “Resisting the KGB Mythmakers: Willy Fisher, Spy Fiction, and the Myth of Rudolf Abel” (2024), and provides insight into his highly anticipated book for 2025, KGB Literati: Spy Fiction and State Security in the Soviet Union (forthcoming with the University of Toronto Press in October 2025).

 As an avid reader of Dr. Kovacevic’s various works, some of which are available on his website, The Chekist Monitor, I was thrilled to attend his recent lecture, “Soviet/Russian State Security PR Projects from Lenin to Putin”, and am eager for him to share his area of expertise with our readers. Dr. Kovacevic, we thank you once again for participating in the Intelligence Education Interview Series and hope that your research impact in the field of intelligence studies will inspire our members, as you have inspired me and so many others in your more than two-decade-long university teaching career.

 Question 1). Let’s start with the basics. How would you like to present yourself to the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE)?

I consider myself an innovative and meticulous researcher and a discoverer of the unknown about the little-known through open and archival sources of information. I am committed to bringing out the intentionally obscured and hidden voices from the past into our contemporary discourse in intelligence studies. We can learn so much from historical research because of the repetitive patterns in intelligence and counterintelligence practices and the unbroken continuities in intelligence cultures. My work is focused on revealing and writing about the up-until-now unknown operations and personnel from the KGB files. The details of such operations are jealously guarded by the current masters in the Kremlin – all former KGB officers – and so what I do is not without a certain amount of risk.

 Question 2). Can you share with our readers what inspired you to pursue the field of intelligence?

 I like to uncover secrets, and there are so many in the secret world of spies and counterspies. It’s like being an archeologist. Your focus is on documented stories rather than artifacts in the ground. However, you have to dig and dig and travel around the world to find all the clues to complete the puzzle. Every intelligence story is like a puzzle, and it’s rare that you can find all the missing pieces. However, some of the documents I uncovered have never been heard about before. For instance, I discovered the transcript of a meeting of KGB counterintelligence leadership in 1955. The top-ranking KGB generals, who were just names up to that point, began speaking in their own voice. You could even discern their character traits from the way they articulated certain things.

 My analysis of this transcript was later published by the Wilson Center, and interested readers can find it here:

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/inside-look-soviet-counterintelligence-mid-1950s.

 Question 3). Dr. Kovacevic, you have extensive experience in the field, both professionally as a geopolitical analyst and academically as a professor. Can you share with our readers what makes a great analyst?

 Intellectual curiosity and willingness to incorporate new insights into whatever you are analyzing. Ideological fixation is the death of all accurate analysis. You’ve got to be open for the unexpected. And you will be surprised. Things are rarely what they seem on the surface. Intelligence officers are excellent manipulators of the human mind, so you’ve got to be careful not to fall into their trap.

  Question 4). On the importance of documenting Russian and Soviet intelligence history, what role would you say these pieces play in modern-day intelligence studies?

 They play a very important role because the current Russian intelligence culture is a close reflection of the Soviet KGB intelligence culture. The personnel names are different, but the anti-foreigner (not only anti-Western) orientation and conspiratorial mentality have remained the same. Many of the current SVR and FSB officers had their fathers and grandfathers (and sometimes even their mothers and grandmothers) employed in the KGB. So we have direct family lines going back into the past. In addition, the educational institutions and operational teaching materials created by the KGB have stayed basically unreformed in post-Soviet Russia, and that is why I am currently engaged in a significant investigative study of KGB educational practices. The Chekists – the collective self-designation of Soviet and Russian state security and intelligence officers  - still aspire to change the world and model it in their own image, which is neither democratic nor liberal.

  Question 5). Dr. Kovacevic, you have over twenty years of experience as an educator. How do you see the future of intelligence and analysis, and how should educators orient themselves? (for example, curriculum).

 I am optimistic about the future of intelligence analysis in the West, but, of course, safeguards need to be put in place to prevent the corrosive influences of contemporary political polarizations from seeping into the intelligence community. Western intelligence and counterintelligence officers must be committed to seeking objective truth rather than to any political party affiliation. The same goes for intelligence educators. We need to be guiding lights for our students and teach them the importance of empathy and working together to confront both internal and external challenges. And it is likely that there will be many challenges in the years ahead. Not only violent conflicts and wars, but also potentially new diseases and catastrophic weather patterns leading to mass population displacements.

 Question 6). In your most recent publication, the research article “Resisting the KGB Mythmakers: Willy Fisher, Spy Fiction, and the Myth of Rudolf Abel” (2024), you detail the life and myth surrounding Soviet intelligence officer Willy Fisher and the extensive efforts by the KGB to bury him under the name of Rudolf Abel. Can you share with our readers what your study reveals regarding the Soviet Union and its intelligence officers?

 One of the major insights from this study is that for Soviet and Russian intelligence officers, no matter how accomplished certain individuals may be (and Fisher-Abel was one of their most successful spies), they are still just cogs in the machinery of state security and must be forced to think of themselves as such. And if they want to voice their independence and assert their autonomy, even minimally, they get crushed by their colleagues. For instance, Willy Fisher was even buried under the false name of Rudolf Abel (the name of his Soviet intelligence colleague and friend who died earlier) and it was only after the desperate protests of his wife and daughter that the KGB chairman Yuri Andropov allowed the addition of his real name to the fake name on his tombstone.

  Question 7). What work do you believe most represents your professional life, and what can future analysts, researchers, and intelligence practitioners learn from it? (For example: documenting Russian and Soviet Intelligence history, can you share the most valuable lessons you have learned from documenting these pieces of history? And what motivated you to create the Chekist Monitor?

 I don’t think I can point to any work in particular but invite the readers to read all of my research works in their totality. What they will learn is that Russian intelligence and counterintelligence services are a serious and dangerous adversary, but also that they are not without their weaknesses. And their biggest weakness is their toxically hierarchical interpersonal relations. The respect for individual accomplishments is not emphasized, and the collective is put far above the individual. And they are brutal in dealing with dissent, both internally and externally.

  The reason I created The Chekist Monitor was to share interesting vignettes and episodes from my ongoing archival research with my readers. I like to tell the secret tales from KGB archives and found this digital outlet to be the most convenient way to do so.

  Question 8). What advice or suggestions would you give our readers/students who are interested in the field of intelligence? Where should they start?

 My main suggestion is to start in the archive, in any archive of any intelligence service. There are digital archives with thousands of unexplored declassified documents—the CIA Crest, the FBI Vault, etc. Also, become an avid filer of the Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests. Though my experience with FOIA is mixed, and sometimes it literally takes several years to get any documents from intelligence agencies, you never know what will come your way. Remember that primary sources are the sine qua non of any good research. Everything else is derived and dependent on somebody else’s interpretation. Be your own person in your investigations. Discover your own archival treasure.

 Question 9). Dr. Kovacevic, in your highly anticipated book KGB Literati: Spy Fiction and State Security in the Soviet Union (forthcoming in October 2025). Can you share with our readers what lessons you hope they will take with them when reading your book?

 My book is about spy fiction written by KGB officers, and it is the first book on this subject matter in any language, including Russian (and I hope it will be translated worldwide). Why is the focus on spy fiction by intelligence officers so important? It is not just entertainment, but it can also illuminate the work of clandestine government organizations and their relations to the societies where they operate in very vivid and intricate ways. At this particular time, spy fiction written by KGB officers is especially relevant because it reflects KGB mentality, norms, and values –in other words, KGB culture – and the present-day Russia is run by former KGB officers. Therefore, analyzing KGB spy fiction can provide relevant insights into understanding the motivations and goals of contemporary Russian foreign and security policies and actions. KGB Literati will be published by the University of Toronto Press, and I invite readers of this interview to read it and send me their feedback.

 Question 10). Lastly, can you share with us five keywords that represent you?

 Curiosity, innovation, courage, persistence, and pedagogy.

Filip Kovacevic: Richard Sorge and KGB General Kondrashev’s Mystification

   Introduction

To date, the most revealing account of the origins and functioning of the Department D [disinformation] of the First Chief Directorate [foreign intelligence] of the KGB is provided in Tennent ‘Pete’ Bagley’s book Spymaster: Startling Cold War Revelations of a Soviet KGB Chief.[1] Bagley’s book came to be thanks to his post-Cold War friendship with KGB General Sergey Kondrashev, a veteran of Soviet intelligence whose career spanned from the late 1940s to the early 1990s. It is essentially Kondrashev’s autobiography which his former employer, now called the SVR [Russia’s foreign intelligence service], forbade him to publish in Russia due to its alleged exposure of KGB secrets. Bagley waited until after Kondrashev’s death to publish it in the United States, sparing Kondrashev from getting into trouble with the Putin regime. He also added his commentary in those places where his own intelligence expertise and experiences as a CIA veteran could provide further clarification and insight, or throw a shadow of doubt on Kondrashev’s claims. Since there were many occasions where he had done so, the book represents a quite remarkable and probably unrepeatable contribution to the understanding of Cold War intelligence history.

Department D

In Chapters 12 and 13, Bagley presented the operational history and major operations of the KGB First Chief Directorate’s Department D (later expanded and renamed the Service A) as related to him by Kondrashev who was the Department’s principal deputy chief from 1962 to 1964 and then its head from 1966 to 1967.[2] Bagley prefaced this important segment of the book with a very short chapter (only 11 pages long) on the involvement of the Department D in resurrecting the public memory of Richard Sorge, the head of a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) agent network in China and Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s. In this brief chapter, Bagley reported Kondrashev’s claims of playing a crucial role in rehabilitating Sorge. However, neither Kondrashev nor Bagley offered any documentary evidence to back up Kondrashev’s account.

Given that the Central Archive of the FSB in Moscow, which holds the files of the Department D, has remained forever closed to the non-FSB affiliated researchers, many independent scholars have despaired of ever being able to document any of Kondrashev’s claims regarding Sorge. However, I have discovered a way of doing so.

While researching the papers of Soviet/Russian General Dmitry Volkogonov, originally deposited in the Library of Congress in Washington DC but accessible on microfilm in the Hoover Institution (my place of research), I came across a thin folder titled “Sorge, Richard (Zorge, Richard (“Ramzai”) and Ekaterina Aleksandrovna Maksimova.”[3] In this folder, I found copies of several original KGB documents signed by Sergey Kondrashev, which dispel any doubts that he was lying to Bagley about his involvement with Sorge’s rehabilitation. However, when I read the documents, it turned out that there were certain interesting differences with what Kondrashev had told Bagley.

Kondrashev’s Mystification

            The most significant document included in the Sorge folder of the Volkogonov Collection is the Department D file titled “Operational Correspondence ‘Asakhi’ on Sorge Ika Richardovich.” The cover page of the file reveals that the file had 388 pages and that it was started on September 24, 1964 and closed on March 2, 1965. In other words, the rehabilitation of Sorge did not take a lot of time. Perhaps one of the reasons for that is that, as some statements in the file indicate, the Soviet Ministry of Defense (most likely, at the initiative of the GRU) had begun looking into the Sorge case already in the mid-1950s and therefore a lot of groundwork investigation had already been completed. Kondrashev told Bagley that during his work on the Sorge case, he had a counterpart from the GRU whom he named Igor Chistyakov.[4] However, as I discovered, there is a reason to suspect that Kondrashev provided a false (invented) name to Bagley and that there was no GRU officer named Colonel Igor Chistyakov, but that the real name of the person involved was Colonel E. Dryakhlov.

            Unfortunately, for some reason, perhaps due to Volkogonov’s lack of interest or loss of access, the Sorge folder contains no more than 35 pages from the original Department D file (less than 10 percent). The most significant document among those included is a 16-page report titled “The Conclusion Regarding the Archival Materials on Richard Sorge.” The report is dated November 2, 1964 and signed by Sergey Kondrashev (his rank at the time was that of a Lieutenant Colonel) and Colonel E. Dryakhlov.[5] Their signatures are followed by the approval of the deputy head of the KGB, Lieutenant General Nikolay Zakharov. The analysis of this report and its comparison with the report described to Bagley by Kondrashev shows that they are one and the same.

In his conversations with Bagley, Kondrashev claimed that the report had 20 pages, was co-signed by GRU Colonel Chistyakov, and then approved by “their chiefs [the heads of the KGB and the GRU]” who sent it on to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Politburo for final approval.[6] What I found tells a different story, however. The only co-signatory of the report is Dryakhlov, not Chistyakov, and there were no approvals by the KGB chairman Vladimir Semichastny or the GRU chief Pyotr Ivashutin, just the approval of Semichastny’s deputy, Zakharov. In other words, it seems that Kondrashev crafted his account to Bagley to exaggerate his importance in Bagley’s eyes and the eyes of Bagley’s future readers. Though at the time when Kondrashev co-wrote the report, he was just a lowly Lieutenant Colonel, a mid-level employee in the vast KGB hierarchy, he wanted to impress Bagley that his work influenced the decision-making of top Soviet state security leadership (who supposedly signed his report) and even the Politburo. This, as Kondrashev’s report itself shows, was a fiction, although it is true that Sorge was fully rehabilitated by the Soviet Communist Party in late 1964 just as Kondrashev’s report advocated. After his rehabilitation, Sorge was turned into a heroic Soviet intelligence celebrity and a recruiting tool by KGB public relations branch, which formed the basis for the KGB Press Bureau established in the late 1960s under Yuri Andropov, and its affiliated writers and journalists.      

            This proven instance of Kondrashev’s fudging the truth makes it imperative to be careful when assessing the rest of his “revelations” to Bagley. Former spies like to aggrandize themselves but sometimes, as in this case, their ego-boosting myths get busted by archival records.

---

NOTES

^[1] Tennent H. Bagley. Spymaster: Startling Cold War Revelations of a Soviet KGB Chief. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2015.

^[2] Ibid., pp. 165-193. Chapter 12 is titled “Organizing to Disinform” and Chapter 13, “Active Measures.”

^[3] The Volkogonov Collection (Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation), Box 4, Folder 9. I gratefully acknowledge the Hoover Institution Library & Archives as an essential resource in the development of these materials. The views expressed in this publication are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, staff, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

^[4] Bagley. Spymaster, pp. 155, 160-161.

^[5] “The Conclusion Regarding the Archival Materials on Richard Sorge,” The Volkogonov Collection, Box 4, Folder 9, p. 16.

^[6]  Bagley. Spymaster, p. 161.

 

Filip Kovacevic: KGB on Israeli Intelligence Activities in 1959

In my research of the Lithuanian KGB files at the Hoover Institution, I have paid particular attention to KGB archival documents on foreign intelligence agencies perceived by the KGB as adversarial. This is complicated by the fact that the files at Hoover do not contain the records of the First Department of the Lithuanian KGB, the branch of the Lithuanian KGB directly in charge of operations outside of the Soviet Union. However, Hoover has the files of the Second Department/Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB tasked with counterintelligence, which also participated in the operations beyond Soviet borders. For example, I have documented a foreign-oriented counterintelligence operation codenamed Operation HORIZON in an article I wrote for the Wilson Center’s Source and Methods blog.[1]

In this article, I want to address my findings concerning KGB reports on Israeli intelligence activities in the late 1950s. While examining the files of the Second Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB for the years 1959 and 1960, I came across a document marked top secret [совершенно секретно] titled “Information Summary [справка] on the Subversive Activities of Foreign Zionist Organizations against the USSR."[2]

This 16-page document was accompanied by a cover letter from General Yevgeny Pitovranov (1915-1999). Pitovranov, who under Stalin briefly headed the Soviet foreign intelligence service and was also imprisoned for a short time, remains one of the most enigmatic figures in the history of the KGB.[3] At the time of the document’s creation, on December 12, 1959, Pitovranov was the head of the Fourth Department of the KGB, the KGB version of the Chekist Secret-Political Department. The main task of the Fourth Department was to monitor and intercept the activities of individuals and groups perceived to be critical or, in the terminology preferred by the KGB, “subversive” of the Soviet regime. The so-called “Zionist” organizations were high on the Fourth Department’s list of priorities as reflected by this document (and numerous others still held indefinitely under the lock and key at the Central Archive of the FSB in Moscow).

Pitovranov’s cover letter was addressed to the chairmen of the KGBs of the Soviet Republics as well as to the heads of the regional KGB branches within Russia. Pitovranov recommended that the contents of the attached 16-page document be shared with those KGB operational officers who were tasked with targeting “Jewish bourgeois nationalists and clergy” in order to use them in their “practical work.”

While most of the document dealt with what KGB counterintelligence claimed to know about the meetings and activities of the Jewish international organizations, such as the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress, which it considered the enemies of the Soviet Union, there is a short section of the document that mentioned the Israeli foreign intelligence service.[4] That section will be the focus of my analysis here.

The section dealt with the allegations of Israeli intelligence activities in Vienna. Based on what it called “agent information” without, however, naming any agents or offering any documentary evidence, KGB claimed that Israeli intelligence had established a “special intelligence center” in Vienna directed against the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries in Eastern Europe. According to the KGB, the head of this center was a certain Karmil [Кармиль] described as the “former head of Israeli intelligence.” Furthermore, KGB alleged that Karmil’s first name was Moshe. It is unclear whether this was a reference to an Israeli politician and military commander Moshe Carmel (1911-2003).[5] There is nothing in Carmel’s publicly available biography to suggest that he was active as a coordinator of Israeli intelligence in Vienna at this time. Therefore, this is either a hitherto unknown fact from his life, or the person in question was another individual with the same name. Or it could be a case of mistaken identity by a KGB agent on the ground in Vienna.

KGB further claimed that in January 1959 “under the leadership of Shaika Dan [Шайка Дан] who came for this reason from Tel Aviv,” there had been a major meeting of Israeli intelligence officers held in Vienna. The focus of this meeting was the question of “legal and illegal” Jewish immigration from the Socialist Bloc countries to Israel. Those present at the meeting included two unnamed Israeli intelligence officers based in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as the alleged station chief [резидент] of Israeli intelligence in Warsaw named Netser [Нецер].[6] According to the KGB, Netser operated under the cover of a cultural and information officer at the Israeli diplomatic mission in Poland.

Netser was also mentioned in connection with his meetings with Soviet citizens acting as agents of the KGB during their visits to Poland.[7] As an illustration, the document provided the details of his meeting with a Soviet citizen who was an agent of the KGB branch in the Mogilev Region [today’s Belarus]. According to the document, Netser’s questions ranged from the living conditions of the Jews in the Soviet Union and their participation in the leadership of the Communist party and the industrial enterprises to the existence of Jewish theaters in Bobruisk [Belarus] and the attitudes of Soviet Jewish youth toward the state of Israel. The document also noted that Netser often met with other agents of the KGB visiting Poland. Presumably, Netser was unaware of their clandestine affiliation, but no evidence of that was provided.

Lastly, the document listed several locations in Vienna as allegedly frequented by Israeli intelligence officers and used for meetings with their sources.[8] The first on the list was the Hotel de France located at Schottenring 3. The hotel was described as a preferred place for debriefing Soviet and Eastern European citizens wanting to immigrate to Israel.[9] The second on the list, evidently a much smaller facility, was the Pension Cosmopolite located at 23 Alser Street. According to the document, the Pension was owned by a Jewish woman who knew several languages and was on the building’s second floor.[10]

Another hotel mentioned was the Hotel Pension Atlanta located in the Währing District of Vienna near the Vienna Woods. This hotel was described as the place of choice for the visiting Israeli diplomats and diplomatic couriers from other parts of Europe as well as for the officials of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting Austria. According to the document, when Israeli diplomats and intelligence officers wanted to relax outside of Vienna, their preferred location was the old-fashioned aristocratic style hotel Grand Panhans, Semmering located in the mountains about 100 kilometers south of Vienna.[11]

The last but probably not the least important place on the list was Kazakov’s Cabaret, apparently a night club frequently visited by “Moshe Karmil and other intelligence officers.”[12] The repertoire of the Cabaret was unfortunately not included.

Postscript

After I published the article above, I was contacted by the intelligence historian Nati Cantorovich who provided me with additional biographical information regarding some individuals mentioned in the KGB document, for which I am very grateful. Cantorovich wrote: “This report deals with Nativ/Lishkat ha-Kesher (The Path, or The Liaison Bureau in Hebrew), a special Israeli governmental agency which managed and led the struggle for the Jews behind the Iron Curtain. Moshe Karmil (previously, Chervinskii) in 1958-1961 was indeed the head of Nativ front office in Viena responsible for communication with the East European Jews. Yeshaayahu Shayke Dan (previously, Trachtenberg), Karmil’s predecessor in Vienna, since 1958 was the director of operations in the Nativ’s Headquarters in Tel Aviv. Zvi Netzer (previously, Melnitzer) in 1957-1961 was Nativ’s envoy in Warsaw. Since the mid-1960s, he became the head of ‘Bar,’ Nativ’s division responsible for communication with the Western Jewish communities.”

---

NOTES

^[1] See Filip Kovacevic, “Operation HORIZON: A KGB Counterintelligence Operation against the West,” Sources & Methods, June 30, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/operation-horizon-kgb-counterintelligence-operation-against-west. Accessed on April 27, 2024. I have recently obtained more archival materials dealing with this operation and plan to revisit it in one of my future articles.

^[2] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 20-36. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution. I gratefully acknowledge the Hoover Institution Library & Archives as an essential resource in the development of these materials. The views expressed in this publication are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, staff, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

^[3] There are, for instance, allegations from well-informed sources that, after his official retirement from the KGB, Pitovranov ran a clandestine Soviet intelligence branch within the Soviet Chamber of Commerce under the KGB chairman Yuri Andropov’s direct supervision. See, for instance, a recent book by a former KGB officer Vladimir Popov who immigrated to Canada in the 1990s and has become a vocal critic of the Putin regime. Vladimir Popov. Заговор негодяев: записки бывшего подполковника КГБ [Conspiracy of Scoundrels: Notes of a Former KGB Lieutenant Colonel]. Kyiv: Gordonua.com, 2020.

^[4] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 28-29.

^[5] See Lawrence Joffe, “Moshe Carmel,” The Guardian, October 16, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/oct/17/guardianobituaries.israel. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[6] An Internet search in English and Russian language did not uncover any publicly available information about the individuals named Dan Shaika and Netser.

^[7] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 31-32.

^[8] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 28-29.

^[9] Hotel de France is still in business and the average room cost is about 200 dollars per night. See “Hotel de France Wien,” https://de-france-hotel-vienna.hotel-ds.com/en/. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[10] While the Pension Cosmopolite appears to have shut its doors forever, today the same building houses the University of Vienna’s Department of Nursing Science, Department of Philosophy, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, and Institute Vienna Circle. See “University of Vienna Locations,” https://www.univie.ac.at/en/about-us/locations-maps/university-of-vienna-locations/. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[11] See “Hotel Grand Panhans Semmering,” https://book.austria.info/en/a-panhans. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[12] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, p. 29. I could find no publicly available information on Kazakov’s Cabaret, but it must have been a very interesting place to spend an evening, perhaps a bit like Rick’s Cafe Americain from the classic film Casablanca.

 

Filip Kovacevic: The Burned Books of the KGB Training School in Vilnius

When the KGB closed down its training school in Vilnius in 1960, many top secret publications from the library stacks were incinerated. The KGB "book burning" committee typically consisted of three officers, including the officer in charge of the special section of the library that housed top secret publications. The "book burning" was authorized by Article 90 of the executive order of the Chairman of the KGB No. 00705 from October 31, 1954. 

Based on my research of the Lithuanian KGB documents at the Hoover Institution, I am now able to reconstruct the list of the titles of the destroyed publications.

In the list below, I have translated the titles from Russian into English. For many publications on the list, this is their first public mention. Prior to this post, there was no public record that they ever existed. 

1.  Nikitinsky and Safonov. Collection of Documents on German Espionage in Tsarist Russia.

2. Nikitinsky. Collection of Documents on the History of Russian Counterintelligence.

3. Svatikov. The Foreign Agent Networks of the Department of Police.

4. The Diagram of the Anti-Soviet and Nationalist Political Parties Active in Lithuania until 1940.

5. Toropov. Methodology of Seminar and Practical Assignments for the Special Discipline No. 1.

6. Bokov. A Methodological Report on the topic "Methodology of Administrating the Written Papers of Students on the Assignments of Special Disciplines."

7. Nadiradze. Report on the topic "On Some Questions on the Methodology of Conducting Consultations."

8. Safiullin. Report on the topic "Methodology of Administrating Practical Assignments on the Spoken Analysis of Operational Tasks."

9. Vorozheikin. Report on the topic "On the Extracurricular Activities with Students of Special Disciplines."

10. Zakharov. Overview of the Case of American Agents-Parachuters Osmanov and Sarantsev.

11. Grishaev et al. Training Manual on the topic "Interrogation of Witnesses."

12. Lisov. Lecture on the topic "Content and Structure of the Course on the Fundamental Principles of the Counterintelligence Activities of State Security."

13. Chistov. Lecture on the topic "Forms and Methods of Subversive Activities against the USSR by the Intelligence Agencies of Bourgeois States and Other Enemies of the Soviet State."

14. Myzin. Lecture on the topic "Forms and Methods of Subversive Activities against the USSR by the Intelligence Agencies of Bourgeois States and Other Enemies of the Soviet State."

15. Aleksandrov. Training Manual on the topic "Running Agents and Their Training."

16. Neboliubov. Lecture on the topic "Running Agents and Their Training."

17. Sorokin. Training Manual on the topic "Methods of External Surveillance."

18. Mikhailov. Lecture on the topic "Perlustration (PK)."

19. Smoliakov et al. Training Manual on the topic "Perlustration (PK)."

20. Sholokov. Overview on the topic "Methods of Contact with the Agents of State Security in the Rural Areas."

21. Kanishchev et al. Training Manual on the topic "Radio Counterintelligence Activities of State Security."

22. Tankaev. Lecture on the topic "Radio Counterintelligence Service."

23. Koval. Lecture on the topic "Operational Records."

24. Gribanov. Transcript of Lecture on the topic "Agent-Based Combination and Its Significance in the Counterintelligence Activities of State Security."

Note: General Oleg Gribanov was the head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate from 1956 to 1964. This is the first public mention of this lecture. For more on Gribanov, see Filip Kovacevic, "'An Ominous Talent': Oleg Gribanov and KGB Counterintelligence" (2022).

25. Training Manual on the topic "Providing Agents for Operational Cultivation."

26. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "Operational Documentation in the Process of Cultivation. Finding and Collecting the Evidence."

27. Vasilchenko. Example of the Operational Documentation of the Criminal Activities of the Suspects at the End of Cultivation.

28. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "The End of Cultivation."

29. Yermakov. Lecture on the topic "Secret Records Keeping and Operational Accounting in the Work of State Security."

30. Blokhin. Overview of the Operation SLAVES OF ZION.

31. Blokhin. Information Summary of the Overview of the Operation SLAVES OF ZION.

32. Shestoboev. Collection of Examples for Spotting, External Surveillance, Perlustration, and Running Numbered Measures.

33. Safiullin. Collection of Examples on the topic "Agent-Based Combination and Cover Stories."

34. The Program for the Studies of Soviet Criminology.

35. Vasilchenko. Operational Assignment on the topic "Record Keeping for Checking and Studying a Candidate for Recruitment."

36. Vasilchenko. Solution for Operational Assignment on the topic "Record Keeping for Checking and Studying a Candidate for Recruitment."

37. Safiullin. Collection of Examples on the topic "Recruiting Agents."

38. Neboliubov. Assignment on the topic "Writing the Report and the Plan for Agent Recruitment."

39. Neboliubov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Writing the Report and the Plan for Agent Recruitment."

40. Igumnov. Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

41. Igumnov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

42. Neboliubov. Collection of Examples and Plans for Agent Entry into Cultivation [разработка].

43. Bokov. Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

44. Bokov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

45. Likhachev. Assignment No. 2 on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

46. Likhachev. Solution for Assignment No. 2 on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

47. Griaznov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

48. Griaznov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

49. Safiullin. Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Report and the Plan of Agent Recruitment."

50. Safiullin. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Report and the Plan of Agent Recruitment."

51. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

52. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

53. Kanishchev. Collection of Basic Operational Document Forms for the Section "Agents of State Security."

54. Starostin. Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

55. Starostin. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

56. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan for Agent Entry into Cultivation."

57. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan for Agent Entry into Cultivation."

58. Griaznov. Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

59. Griaznov. A Model Solution for Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

60. Marakushev. Collection of Assignments on Agent Entry into Cultivation.

61. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

62. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

63. Ovcharenko. Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

64. Ovcharenko. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

65. Marakushev. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

66. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking."

67. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking."

68. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking."

69. Neboliubov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking in Writing."

70. Neboliubov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking in Writing."

71. Vasilchenko. Collection of Examples of Plans of Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation (for practical exercises).

72. Tebenkov. Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

73. Tebenkov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

74. Griaznov. Collection of Document Forms for Operational Accounting and Informing the Party Leadership.

75. Collection of Assignments on the topic "Drafting Emergency Report."

76. Solutions to Assignments on the topic "Drafting Emergency Report."

77. Klochko et al. Collection of Assignments on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

78. Klochko et al. Solutions to Assignments on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

79. Bodrov and Lebedev. Assignment on the topic "Agent Exit from Cultivation."

80. Vasilchenko and Pushkarev. Solution to Assignment on the topic "Agent Exit from Cultivation."

81. Sherstoboev. Collection of Document Forms for Operational Accounting and Information for the Party Leadership.

82. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan of Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

83. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan of Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

84. Sivakov. Assignment on the topic "Interception of Penetration Channels of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services into the Territory of USSR and Infiltration of KGB Agents into the Intelligence Centers of Imperialist States." (Based on Operation LINK)

85. Sivakov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Interception of Penetration Channels of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services into the Territory of USSR and Infiltration of KGB Agents into the Intelligence Centers of Imperialist States." (Based on Operation LINK)

86. Khodin. Assignment on the topic "Interception of Channels of Communication between Foreign Intelligence Service and Its Agents in the USSR."

87. Khodin. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Interception of Channels of Communication between Foreign Intelligence Service and Its Agents in the USSR."

88. Odintsov. Assignment on the topic "Dangling Agents of State Security to the Representative of a Foreign Anti-Soviet Organization."

89. Odintsov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Dangling Agents of State Security to the Representative of a Foreign Anti-Soviet Organization."

90. Fotin. Document Form of Agent's Personal File.

91. Neboliubov. Lecture on the topic "Subversive Activities of American Intelligence."

92. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of British Intelligence."

93. Miakotnykh. Teaching Materials on the topic "Subversive Activities of British Intelligence and Combat against it by State Security."

94. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Subversive Activities of French Intelligence."

95. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Agents of Bourgeois States among Orthodox Church priests and clergy."

96. Dubas. Teaching Materials on the topic "Finnish Intelligence."

97. Davidian. Teaching Materials on the topic "Subversive Activities of Iranian Intelligence against the USSR and Combat against It by State Security."

98. Davidian. Teaching Materials on the topic "Subversive Activities of Turkish Intelligence against the USSR and Combat against It by State Security."

99. Kniazev. Teaching Materials on the topic "Japanese Intelligence."

100. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Foreign Anti-Soviet Centers and Their Agents on the Territory of USSR."

101. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Intelligence Services of Bourgeois States. Offensive Tactics of KGB in Combat against Bourgeois Intelligence Services."

102. Guliaev. Overview of "The Search for and Capture of American Spy Novinsky."

103. Tatarinov & Pushkarev. Overview of "The Search for & Capture of American Agents, Representatives of Foreign Nationalist Organization 'Hawks of Dvina' [Hawks of the River Daugava Daugavas Vanagi]

104. Tatarinov & Pushkarev. Information Summary of Overview of "The Search for & Capture of American Agents, Representatives of Foreign Nationalist Organization 'Hawks of Dvina' [Hawks of the River Daugava - Daugavas Vanagi]."

105. Mamaev. Teaching Handbook on the topic "Anti-Soviet Activities of Jewish Nationalists and Combat against Them by State Security."

106. Safiullin. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Bourgeois Nationalists."

107. Boichenko. Teaching Materials on the topic "Belarus Bourgeois Nationalists."

108. Polubinsky. Overview of Operation INITIATIVE.

109. Khamaziuk and Kasatkin. Overview of Operation INTERCEPT.

110. Guliaev. Overview of the Search Case for Agent of West German Intelligence Postnikov.

111. Khodin. Overview of the Case DWARF.

112. Vasilchenko. Overview of Agent-Based Combination for Infiltrating Intelligence Services of the Adversary.

113. Shuliak. Teaching Materials on the topic "Combat of State Security against Agents of the Vatican."

114. Lutov. Teaching Handbook on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Agents of Bourgeois States among Orthodox Church priests and clergy."

115. Collection of Overviews on the Search for State Criminals.

116. Solovev. Lecture on the topic "The Search for State Criminals."

117. Terekhov. Lecture on the topic "The Search for State Criminals."

118. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Agents of Intelligence Services of Bourgeois States Among the Sect Members."

119. Teaching Handbook on the topic "The Search for Authors and Distributors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents."

120. Izmailov. Collection of Examples on the topic "The Search for Authors and Distributors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents."

121. Evteev. Overview of Operation CLOSED CIRCUIT.

122. Evteev. Analysis of the Overview of Operation CLOSED CIRCUIT.

123. Kazantsev. Lecture on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work on Defense and Other Facilities of Special Importance."

124. Bushuev. Lecture on the topic "Organization of the Search for Enemy Agents Entering the Territory of the USSR from the Air, the Sea, and the Land."

125. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Organization of the Search for Enemy Agents Entering the Territory of the USSR from the Air, the Sea, and the Land."

126. Vedernikov. Lecture on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work on the Rail and Water Transport."

127. Butorov et al. Teaching Materials on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work on the Rail and Water Transport."

128. Ostriakov. Lecture on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work of the Special Departments in the Soviet Army and Fleet."

129. Mironov. Lecture on the topic "Organization of the Leadership of the Special Departments of State Security."

130. Kisminas. Lecture on the topic "Interrogation of the Suspect."

131. Borisenko. Overview of the Search Operation AESCULAPIUS. 

132. Borisenko. Analysis of the Overview of the Search Operation AESCULAPIUS. 

133. Kalistratov. Overview of the Search Operation TROTTER.

134. Kalistratov. Analysis of the Overview of the Search Operation TROTTER.

135. Materials on Obtaining Permission to Do Secret Work.

136. Solution Regarding the Materials on Obtaining Permission to Do Secret Work.

137. Kisminas. Lecture on the topic "Termination of Preliminary Investigation."

138. Verdiev. Teaching Materials on the topic "Termination of Preliminary Investigation."

139. Teaching-Investigation Case Regarding the Charges Against I. P. Reshetnikov.

140. Collection of Documents on the History of VChK-OGPU (1917-1924).

141. Skitov. Overview - Investigation of Sabotage (based on the Investigation Case of Diachuk and Zaitsev).

142. Tikhonov. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Espionage Cases."

143. Marakushev. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Wrecking Cases."

144. Kariabkin. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Group Cases."

145. Beliansky. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Sabotage Cases."

146. Petrov. Collection of Assignments-Examples of Analysis of Indictments (for oral examinations).

147. Marakushev. Overview of "Documentation of Criminal Activities of the Anti-Soviet Element in the Process of His Cultivation and During the Investigation of Emergency Situations."

148. Melnikov. Overview of the Investigation Case of the Agent of American Intelligence Asadzaki.

149. Maklakov. Collection of the Forms for Investigation Documentation. 

150. Kovalenko. Assignment on the topic "Investigation of Sabotage Cases."

151. Kovalenko. Solution for the Assignment on the topic "Investigation of Sabotage Cases."

152. Album "Subversive Activities of Intelligence Services of Capitalist States against the Soviet Union and Some Measures of Soviet State Security to Stop Them."

153. Vasilega. Overview of the Materials on the Eliminated Bandit Groups of the Lithuanian Nationalist Underground.

154. Sample Plans of Courses for the Second-Year Students on the First and Second Special Discipline. 

155. Petrov. Assignment on the Search Operation for the Agent of American Intelligence K. P. Dirzhis (for oral examinations). 

156. Photographs of the Hidеouts оf the Belarus Anti-Soviet Nationalist Underground (one album, 22 photographs).

157. Senichev. Overview of the Cultivation Operation POISONOUS. 

158. Photo Album of the Bunkers/Hideouts of the Lithuanian Nationalist Underground.

159. Griaznov. Methodological Report on the topic "On Measures for Eliciting Collegial Discussions During Seminars on Chekist Disciplines." 

160. Azarov. Assignment on the topic "Seizure of the Channels of Communication of the Agents of Intelligence Services of Bourgeois States.

161. Fedotov. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security Against the Subversive Activities of Foreign Intelligence Services Against the USSR."

162. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Obtaining and Using Safe Houses in Practical Work with Agents."

163. Pochkai. Teaching Handbook on the topic "Combat of State Security Against the Subversive Activities of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Anti-Soviet Nationalist Underground."

164. Kazakov. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security Against the Subversive Activities of the Agents of the German Fascist Intelligence Service and the Intelligence Services of West Germany."

165. Diagram on the topic "Main Intelligence and Counterintelligence Agencies of Great Britain."

166. Safiullin. Methodological Report on the topic "Concluding Remarks of Instructor at the End of Training Seminars."

167. Zavyrylin. Lecture on the topic "Moral Qualities of the Soviet Intelligence Officer."

168. Diagram on the topic "Foreign Centers of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Bourgeois Nationalists."

169. Bulgakov. Teaching Materials on the topic "Documentаtion Equipment."

170. Milkamanovich. Transcript of Lecture on the topic "Preparation and Management of Seminars and Practical Exercises in the KGB."

171. Beliaev. Methodological Instructions on the question of organizing a seminar for operational officers on the topic "Recruitment of Agents."  

This list will be periodically updated as I add more titles from the KGB files.