Filip Kovacevic: KGB on Israeli Intelligence Activities in 1959

In my research of the Lithuanian KGB files at the Hoover Institution, I have paid particular attention to KGB archival documents on foreign intelligence agencies perceived by the KGB as adversarial. This is complicated by the fact that the files at Hoover do not contain the records of the First Department of the Lithuanian KGB, the branch of the Lithuanian KGB directly in charge of operations outside of the Soviet Union. However, Hoover has the files of the Second Department/Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB tasked with counterintelligence, which also participated in the operations beyond Soviet borders. For example, I have documented a foreign-oriented counterintelligence operation codenamed Operation HORIZON in an article I wrote for the Wilson Center’s Source and Methods blog.[1]

In this article, I want to address my findings concerning KGB reports on Israeli intelligence activities in the late 1950s. While examining the files of the Second Directorate of the Lithuanian KGB for the years 1959 and 1960, I came across a document marked top secret [совершенно секретно] titled “Information Summary [справка] on the Subversive Activities of Foreign Zionist Organizations against the USSR."[2]

This 16-page document was accompanied by a cover letter from General Yevgeny Pitovranov (1915-1999). Pitovranov, who under Stalin briefly headed the Soviet foreign intelligence service and was also imprisoned for a short time, remains one of the most enigmatic figures in the history of the KGB.[3] At the time of the document’s creation, on December 12, 1959, Pitovranov was the head of the Fourth Department of the KGB, the KGB version of the Chekist Secret-Political Department. The main task of the Fourth Department was to monitor and intercept the activities of individuals and groups perceived to be critical or, in the terminology preferred by the KGB, “subversive” of the Soviet regime. The so-called “Zionist” organizations were high on the Fourth Department’s list of priorities as reflected by this document (and numerous others still held indefinitely under the lock and key at the Central Archive of the FSB in Moscow).

Pitovranov’s cover letter was addressed to the chairmen of the KGBs of the Soviet Republics as well as to the heads of the regional KGB branches within Russia. Pitovranov recommended that the contents of the attached 16-page document be shared with those KGB operational officers who were tasked with targeting “Jewish bourgeois nationalists and clergy” in order to use them in their “practical work.”

While most of the document dealt with what KGB counterintelligence claimed to know about the meetings and activities of the Jewish international organizations, such as the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress, which it considered the enemies of the Soviet Union, there is a short section of the document that mentioned the Israeli foreign intelligence service.[4] That section will be the focus of my analysis here.

The section dealt with the allegations of Israeli intelligence activities in Vienna. Based on what it called “agent information” without, however, naming any agents or offering any documentary evidence, KGB claimed that Israeli intelligence had established a “special intelligence center” in Vienna directed against the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries in Eastern Europe. According to the KGB, the head of this center was a certain Karmil [Кармиль] described as the “former head of Israeli intelligence.” Furthermore, KGB alleged that Karmil’s first name was Moshe. It is unclear whether this was a reference to an Israeli politician and military commander Moshe Carmel (1911-2003).[5] There is nothing in Carmel’s publicly available biography to suggest that he was active as a coordinator of Israeli intelligence in Vienna at this time. Therefore, this is either a hitherto unknown fact from his life, or the person in question was another individual with the same name. Or it could be a case of mistaken identity by a KGB agent on the ground in Vienna.

KGB further claimed that in January 1959 “under the leadership of Shaika Dan [Шайка Дан] who came for this reason from Tel Aviv,” there had been a major meeting of Israeli intelligence officers held in Vienna. The focus of this meeting was the question of “legal and illegal” Jewish immigration from the Socialist Bloc countries to Israel. Those present at the meeting included two unnamed Israeli intelligence officers based in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as the alleged station chief [резидент] of Israeli intelligence in Warsaw named Netser [Нецер].[6] According to the KGB, Netser operated under the cover of a cultural and information officer at the Israeli diplomatic mission in Poland.

Netser was also mentioned in connection with his meetings with Soviet citizens acting as agents of the KGB during their visits to Poland.[7] As an illustration, the document provided the details of his meeting with a Soviet citizen who was an agent of the KGB branch in the Mogilev Region [today’s Belarus]. According to the document, Netser’s questions ranged from the living conditions of the Jews in the Soviet Union and their participation in the leadership of the Communist party and the industrial enterprises to the existence of Jewish theaters in Bobruisk [Belarus] and the attitudes of Soviet Jewish youth toward the state of Israel. The document also noted that Netser often met with other agents of the KGB visiting Poland. Presumably, Netser was unaware of their clandestine affiliation, but no evidence of that was provided.

Lastly, the document listed several locations in Vienna as allegedly frequented by Israeli intelligence officers and used for meetings with their sources.[8] The first on the list was the Hotel de France located at Schottenring 3. The hotel was described as a preferred place for debriefing Soviet and Eastern European citizens wanting to immigrate to Israel.[9] The second on the list, evidently a much smaller facility, was the Pension Cosmopolite located at 23 Alser Street. According to the document, the Pension was owned by a Jewish woman who knew several languages and was on the building’s second floor.[10]

Another hotel mentioned was the Hotel Pension Atlanta located in the Währing District of Vienna near the Vienna Woods. This hotel was described as the place of choice for the visiting Israeli diplomats and diplomatic couriers from other parts of Europe as well as for the officials of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting Austria. According to the document, when Israeli diplomats and intelligence officers wanted to relax outside of Vienna, their preferred location was the old-fashioned aristocratic style hotel Grand Panhans, Semmering located in the mountains about 100 kilometers south of Vienna.[11]

The last but probably not the least important place on the list was Kazakov’s Cabaret, apparently a night club frequently visited by “Moshe Karmil and other intelligence officers.”[12] The repertoire of the Cabaret was unfortunately not included.

Postscript

After I published the article above, I was contacted by the intelligence historian Nati Cantorovich who provided me with additional biographical information regarding some individuals mentioned in the KGB document, for which I am very grateful. Cantorovich wrote: “This report deals with Nativ/Lishkat ha-Kesher (The Path, or The Liaison Bureau in Hebrew), a special Israeli governmental agency which managed and led the struggle for the Jews behind the Iron Curtain. Moshe Karmil (previously, Chervinskii) in 1958-1961 was indeed the head of Nativ front office in Viena responsible for communication with the East European Jews. Yeshaayahu Shayke Dan (previously, Trachtenberg), Karmil’s predecessor in Vienna, since 1958 was the director of operations in the Nativ’s Headquarters in Tel Aviv. Zvi Netzer (previously, Melnitzer) in 1957-1961 was Nativ’s envoy in Warsaw. Since the mid-1960s, he became the head of ‘Bar,’ Nativ’s division responsible for communication with the Western Jewish communities.”

---

NOTES

^[1] See Filip Kovacevic, “Operation HORIZON: A KGB Counterintelligence Operation against the West,” Sources & Methods, June 30, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/operation-horizon-kgb-counterintelligence-operation-against-west. Accessed on April 27, 2024. I have recently obtained more archival materials dealing with this operation and plan to revisit it in one of my future articles.

^[2] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 20-36. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution. I gratefully acknowledge the Hoover Institution Library & Archives as an essential resource in the development of these materials. The views expressed in this publication are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, staff, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

^[3] There are, for instance, allegations from well-informed sources that, after his official retirement from the KGB, Pitovranov ran a clandestine Soviet intelligence branch within the Soviet Chamber of Commerce under the KGB chairman Yuri Andropov’s direct supervision. See, for instance, a recent book by a former KGB officer Vladimir Popov who immigrated to Canada in the 1990s and has become a vocal critic of the Putin regime. Vladimir Popov. Заговор негодяев: записки бывшего подполковника КГБ [Conspiracy of Scoundrels: Notes of a Former KGB Lieutenant Colonel]. Kyiv: Gordonua.com, 2020.

^[4] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 28-29.

^[5] See Lawrence Joffe, “Moshe Carmel,” The Guardian, October 16, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/oct/17/guardianobituaries.israel. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[6] An Internet search in English and Russian language did not uncover any publicly available information about the individuals named Dan Shaika and Netser.

^[7] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 31-32.

^[8] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, pp. 28-29.

^[9] Hotel de France is still in business and the average room cost is about 200 dollars per night. See “Hotel de France Wien,” https://de-france-hotel-vienna.hotel-ds.com/en/. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[10] While the Pension Cosmopolite appears to have shut its doors forever, today the same building houses the University of Vienna’s Department of Nursing Science, Department of Philosophy, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, and Institute Vienna Circle. See “University of Vienna Locations,” https://www.univie.ac.at/en/about-us/locations-maps/university-of-vienna-locations/. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[11] See “Hotel Grand Panhans Semmering,” https://book.austria.info/en/a-panhans. Accessed on April 27, 2024.

^[12] Fond K-1, Inv. 3, File 569, p. 29. I could find no publicly available information on Kazakov’s Cabaret, but it must have been a very interesting place to spend an evening, perhaps a bit like Rick’s Cafe Americain from the classic film Casablanca.

 

Filip Kovacevic: The Burned Books of the KGB Training School in Vilnius

When the KGB closed down its training school in Vilnius in 1960, many top secret publications from the library stacks were incinerated. The KGB "book burning" committee typically consisted of three officers, including the officer in charge of the special section of the library that housed top secret publications. The "book burning" was authorized by Article 90 of the executive order of the Chairman of the KGB No. 00705 from October 31, 1954. 

Based on my research of the Lithuanian KGB documents at the Hoover Institution, I am now able to reconstruct the list of the titles of the destroyed publications.

In the list below, I have translated the titles from Russian into English. For many publications on the list, this is their first public mention. Prior to this post, there was no public record that they ever existed. 

1.  Nikitinsky and Safonov. Collection of Documents on German Espionage in Tsarist Russia.

2. Nikitinsky. Collection of Documents on the History of Russian Counterintelligence.

3. Svatikov. The Foreign Agent Networks of the Department of Police.

4. The Diagram of the Anti-Soviet and Nationalist Political Parties Active in Lithuania until 1940.

5. Toropov. Methodology of Seminar and Practical Assignments for the Special Discipline No. 1.

6. Bokov. A Methodological Report on the topic "Methodology of Administrating the Written Papers of Students on the Assignments of Special Disciplines."

7. Nadiradze. Report on the topic "On Some Questions on the Methodology of Conducting Consultations."

8. Safiullin. Report on the topic "Methodology of Administrating Practical Assignments on the Spoken Analysis of Operational Tasks."

9. Vorozheikin. Report on the topic "On the Extracurricular Activities with Students of Special Disciplines."

10. Zakharov. Overview of the Case of American Agents-Parachuters Osmanov and Sarantsev.

11. Grishaev et al. Training Manual on the topic "Interrogation of Witnesses."

12. Lisov. Lecture on the topic "Content and Structure of the Course on the Fundamental Principles of the Counterintelligence Activities of State Security."

13. Chistov. Lecture on the topic "Forms and Methods of Subversive Activities against the USSR by the Intelligence Agencies of Bourgeois States and Other Enemies of the Soviet State."

14. Myzin. Lecture on the topic "Forms and Methods of Subversive Activities against the USSR by the Intelligence Agencies of Bourgeois States and Other Enemies of the Soviet State."

15. Aleksandrov. Training Manual on the topic "Running Agents and Their Training."

16. Neboliubov. Lecture on the topic "Running Agents and Their Training."

17. Sorokin. Training Manual on the topic "Methods of External Surveillance."

18. Mikhailov. Lecture on the topic "Perlustration (PK)."

19. Smoliakov et al. Training Manual on the topic "Perlustration (PK)."

20. Sholokov. Overview on the topic "Methods of Contact with the Agents of State Security in the Rural Areas."

21. Kanishchev et al. Training Manual on the topic "Radio Counterintelligence Activities of State Security."

22. Tankaev. Lecture on the topic "Radio Counterintelligence Service."

23. Koval. Lecture on the topic "Operational Records."

24. Gribanov. Transcript of Lecture on the topic "Agent-Based Combination and Its Significance in the Counterintelligence Activities of State Security."

Note: General Oleg Gribanov was the head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate from 1956 to 1964. This is the first public mention of this lecture. For more on Gribanov, see Filip Kovacevic, "'An Ominous Talent': Oleg Gribanov and KGB Counterintelligence" (2022).

25. Training Manual on the topic "Providing Agents for Operational Cultivation."

26. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "Operational Documentation in the Process of Cultivation. Finding and Collecting the Evidence."

27. Vasilchenko. Example of the Operational Documentation of the Criminal Activities of the Suspects at the End of Cultivation.

28. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "The End of Cultivation."

29. Yermakov. Lecture on the topic "Secret Records Keeping and Operational Accounting in the Work of State Security."

30. Blokhin. Overview of the Operation SLAVES OF ZION.

31. Blokhin. Information Summary of the Overview of the Operation SLAVES OF ZION.

32. Shestoboev. Collection of Examples for Spotting, External Surveillance, Perlustration, and Running Numbered Measures.

33. Safiullin. Collection of Examples on the topic "Agent-Based Combination and Cover Stories."

34. The Program for the Studies of Soviet Criminology.

35. Vasilchenko. Operational Assignment on the topic "Record Keeping for Checking and Studying a Candidate for Recruitment."

36. Vasilchenko. Solution for Operational Assignment on the topic "Record Keeping for Checking and Studying a Candidate for Recruitment."

37. Safiullin. Collection of Examples on the topic "Recruiting Agents."

38. Neboliubov. Assignment on the topic "Writing the Report and the Plan for Agent Recruitment."

39. Neboliubov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Writing the Report and the Plan for Agent Recruitment."

40. Igumnov. Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

41. Igumnov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

42. Neboliubov. Collection of Examples and Plans for Agent Entry into Cultivation [разработка].

43. Bokov. Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

44. Bokov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Selection of a Candidate for Recruitment. Drafting the Report and the Plan of Recruitment."

45. Likhachev. Assignment No. 2 on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

46. Likhachev. Solution for Assignment No. 2 on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

47. Griaznov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

48. Griaznov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

49. Safiullin. Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Report and the Plan of Agent Recruitment."

50. Safiullin. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Report and the Plan of Agent Recruitment."

51. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

52. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

53. Kanishchev. Collection of Basic Operational Document Forms for the Section "Agents of State Security."

54. Starostin. Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

55. Starostin. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Recruitment."

56. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan for Agent Entry into Cultivation."

57. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan for Agent Entry into Cultivation."

58. Griaznov. Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

59. Griaznov. A Model Solution for Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

60. Marakushev. Collection of Assignments on Agent Entry into Cultivation.

61. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

62. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

63. Ovcharenko. Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

64. Ovcharenko. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

65. Marakushev. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Entry into Cultivation."

66. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking."

67. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking."

68. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking."

69. Neboliubov. Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking in Writing."

70. Neboliubov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Agent Tasking in Writing."

71. Vasilchenko. Collection of Examples of Plans of Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation (for practical exercises).

72. Tebenkov. Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

73. Tebenkov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Planning Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

74. Griaznov. Collection of Document Forms for Operational Accounting and Informing the Party Leadership.

75. Collection of Assignments on the topic "Drafting Emergency Report."

76. Solutions to Assignments on the topic "Drafting Emergency Report."

77. Klochko et al. Collection of Assignments on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

78. Klochko et al. Solutions to Assignments on the topic "Analysis of Agent Reports."

79. Bodrov and Lebedev. Assignment on the topic "Agent Exit from Cultivation."

80. Vasilchenko and Pushkarev. Solution to Assignment on the topic "Agent Exit from Cultivation."

81. Sherstoboev. Collection of Document Forms for Operational Accounting and Information for the Party Leadership.

82. Bodrov. Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan of Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

83. Bodrov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Drafting the Plan of Agent-Operational Measures for Cultivation."

84. Sivakov. Assignment on the topic "Interception of Penetration Channels of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services into the Territory of USSR and Infiltration of KGB Agents into the Intelligence Centers of Imperialist States." (Based on Operation LINK)

85. Sivakov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Interception of Penetration Channels of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services into the Territory of USSR and Infiltration of KGB Agents into the Intelligence Centers of Imperialist States." (Based on Operation LINK)

86. Khodin. Assignment on the topic "Interception of Channels of Communication between Foreign Intelligence Service and Its Agents in the USSR."

87. Khodin. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Interception of Channels of Communication between Foreign Intelligence Service and Its Agents in the USSR."

88. Odintsov. Assignment on the topic "Dangling Agents of State Security to the Representative of a Foreign Anti-Soviet Organization."

89. Odintsov. Solution for Assignment on the topic "Dangling Agents of State Security to the Representative of a Foreign Anti-Soviet Organization."

90. Fotin. Document Form of Agent's Personal File.

91. Neboliubov. Lecture on the topic "Subversive Activities of American Intelligence."

92. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of British Intelligence."

93. Miakotnykh. Teaching Materials on the topic "Subversive Activities of British Intelligence and Combat against it by State Security."

94. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Subversive Activities of French Intelligence."

95. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Agents of Bourgeois States among Orthodox Church priests and clergy."

96. Dubas. Teaching Materials on the topic "Finnish Intelligence."

97. Davidian. Teaching Materials on the topic "Subversive Activities of Iranian Intelligence against the USSR and Combat against It by State Security."

98. Davidian. Teaching Materials on the topic "Subversive Activities of Turkish Intelligence against the USSR and Combat against It by State Security."

99. Kniazev. Teaching Materials on the topic "Japanese Intelligence."

100. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Foreign Anti-Soviet Centers and Their Agents on the Territory of USSR."

101. Vasilchenko. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Intelligence Services of Bourgeois States. Offensive Tactics of KGB in Combat against Bourgeois Intelligence Services."

102. Guliaev. Overview of "The Search for and Capture of American Spy Novinsky."

103. Tatarinov & Pushkarev. Overview of "The Search for & Capture of American Agents, Representatives of Foreign Nationalist Organization 'Hawks of Dvina' [Hawks of the River Daugava Daugavas Vanagi]

104. Tatarinov & Pushkarev. Information Summary of Overview of "The Search for & Capture of American Agents, Representatives of Foreign Nationalist Organization 'Hawks of Dvina' [Hawks of the River Daugava - Daugavas Vanagi]."

105. Mamaev. Teaching Handbook on the topic "Anti-Soviet Activities of Jewish Nationalists and Combat against Them by State Security."

106. Safiullin. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Bourgeois Nationalists."

107. Boichenko. Teaching Materials on the topic "Belarus Bourgeois Nationalists."

108. Polubinsky. Overview of Operation INITIATIVE.

109. Khamaziuk and Kasatkin. Overview of Operation INTERCEPT.

110. Guliaev. Overview of the Search Case for Agent of West German Intelligence Postnikov.

111. Khodin. Overview of the Case DWARF.

112. Vasilchenko. Overview of Agent-Based Combination for Infiltrating Intelligence Services of the Adversary.

113. Shuliak. Teaching Materials on the topic "Combat of State Security against Agents of the Vatican."

114. Lutov. Teaching Handbook on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Agents of Bourgeois States among Orthodox Church priests and clergy."

115. Collection of Overviews on the Search for State Criminals.

116. Solovev. Lecture on the topic "The Search for State Criminals."

117. Terekhov. Lecture on the topic "The Search for State Criminals."

118. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security against Subversive Activities of Agents of Intelligence Services of Bourgeois States Among the Sect Members."

119. Teaching Handbook on the topic "The Search for Authors and Distributors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents."

120. Izmailov. Collection of Examples on the topic "The Search for Authors and Distributors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents."

121. Evteev. Overview of Operation CLOSED CIRCUIT.

122. Evteev. Analysis of the Overview of Operation CLOSED CIRCUIT.

123. Kazantsev. Lecture on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work on Defense and Other Facilities of Special Importance."

124. Bushuev. Lecture on the topic "Organization of the Search for Enemy Agents Entering the Territory of the USSR from the Air, the Sea, and the Land."

125. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Organization of the Search for Enemy Agents Entering the Territory of the USSR from the Air, the Sea, and the Land."

126. Vedernikov. Lecture on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work on the Rail and Water Transport."

127. Butorov et al. Teaching Materials on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work on the Rail and Water Transport."

128. Ostriakov. Lecture on the topic "Organization of Counterintelligence Work of the Special Departments in the Soviet Army and Fleet."

129. Mironov. Lecture on the topic "Organization of the Leadership of the Special Departments of State Security."

130. Kisminas. Lecture on the topic "Interrogation of the Suspect."

131. Borisenko. Overview of the Search Operation AESCULAPIUS. 

132. Borisenko. Analysis of the Overview of the Search Operation AESCULAPIUS. 

133. Kalistratov. Overview of the Search Operation TROTTER.

134. Kalistratov. Analysis of the Overview of the Search Operation TROTTER.

135. Materials on Obtaining Permission to Do Secret Work.

136. Solution Regarding the Materials on Obtaining Permission to Do Secret Work.

137. Kisminas. Lecture on the topic "Termination of Preliminary Investigation."

138. Verdiev. Teaching Materials on the topic "Termination of Preliminary Investigation."

139. Teaching-Investigation Case Regarding the Charges Against I. P. Reshetnikov.

140. Collection of Documents on the History of VChK-OGPU (1917-1924).

141. Skitov. Overview - Investigation of Sabotage (based on the Investigation Case of Diachuk and Zaitsev).

142. Tikhonov. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Espionage Cases."

143. Marakushev. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Wrecking Cases."

144. Kariabkin. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Group Cases."

145. Beliansky. Lecture on the topic "Investigation of Sabotage Cases."

146. Petrov. Collection of Assignments-Examples of Analysis of Indictments (for oral examinations).

147. Marakushev. Overview of "Documentation of Criminal Activities of the Anti-Soviet Element in the Process of His Cultivation and During the Investigation of Emergency Situations."

148. Melnikov. Overview of the Investigation Case of the Agent of American Intelligence Asadzaki.

149. Maklakov. Collection of the Forms for Investigation Documentation. 

150. Kovalenko. Assignment on the topic "Investigation of Sabotage Cases."

151. Kovalenko. Solution for the Assignment on the topic "Investigation of Sabotage Cases."

152. Album "Subversive Activities of Intelligence Services of Capitalist States against the Soviet Union and Some Measures of Soviet State Security to Stop Them."

153. Vasilega. Overview of the Materials on the Eliminated Bandit Groups of the Lithuanian Nationalist Underground.

154. Sample Plans of Courses for the Second-Year Students on the First and Second Special Discipline. 

155. Petrov. Assignment on the Search Operation for the Agent of American Intelligence K. P. Dirzhis (for oral examinations). 

156. Photographs of the Hidеouts оf the Belarus Anti-Soviet Nationalist Underground (one album, 22 photographs).

157. Senichev. Overview of the Cultivation Operation POISONOUS. 

158. Photo Album of the Bunkers/Hideouts of the Lithuanian Nationalist Underground.

159. Griaznov. Methodological Report on the topic "On Measures for Eliciting Collegial Discussions During Seminars on Chekist Disciplines." 

160. Azarov. Assignment on the topic "Seizure of the Channels of Communication of the Agents of Intelligence Services of Bourgeois States.

161. Fedotov. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security Against the Subversive Activities of Foreign Intelligence Services Against the USSR."

162. Pushkarev. Lecture on the topic "Obtaining and Using Safe Houses in Practical Work with Agents."

163. Pochkai. Teaching Handbook on the topic "Combat of State Security Against the Subversive Activities of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Anti-Soviet Nationalist Underground."

164. Kazakov. Lecture on the topic "Combat of State Security Against the Subversive Activities of the Agents of the German Fascist Intelligence Service and the Intelligence Services of West Germany."

165. Diagram on the topic "Main Intelligence and Counterintelligence Agencies of Great Britain."

166. Safiullin. Methodological Report on the topic "Concluding Remarks of Instructor at the End of Training Seminars."

167. Zavyrylin. Lecture on the topic "Moral Qualities of the Soviet Intelligence Officer."

168. Diagram on the topic "Foreign Centers of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Bourgeois Nationalists."

169. Bulgakov. Teaching Materials on the topic "Documentаtion Equipment."

170. Milkamanovich. Transcript of Lecture on the topic "Preparation and Management of Seminars and Practical Exercises in the KGB."

171. Beliaev. Methodological Instructions on the question of organizing a seminar for operational officers on the topic "Recruitment of Agents."  

This list will be periodically updated as I add more titles from the KGB files.

 

Filip Kovacevic: How KGB Spied on Foreign Journalists and Diplomats in the 1960s Lithuania

In the late 1950s, Nikita Khrushchev’s policies opened the Soviet Union to foreign visitors. The large influx of Western journalists, students, and tourists necessitated changes in the KGB standard operating procedures. More sophisticated methods of surveillance and counterintelligence collection were required. Special units were created to study how the KGBs of the Soviet Republics coped with the emerging challenges.

One of these units was set up at the headquarters of the KGB of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in Vilnius. On September 27, 1960, the unit's high-ranking member, Lt. Colonel Tumantsev, filed a report on the surveillance and other covert measures which the KGB operatives employed during the visits of foreign diplomats and journalists. His top secret report was digitized by the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania in 2012 and is discussed here in English for the first time.[1]

In the report, Tumantsev described the details of two separate operations involving the search of the hotel rooms of the visiting foreigners known in the KGB technical jargon as the Measure “E.” Both operations took place at the Hotel Vilnius in Vilnius. The target of the first operation was the room of Italian journalist Wanda Grawonska[2] who came to Vilnius accompanied by the first secretary of the Italian Embassy in Moscow, Enrico Carrara. The visit in question took place in February 1960.

According to Tumantsev, Carrara was known to the KGB as an officer of the Italian foreign intelligence service and had a “weakness for alcoholic beverages and women,” which the KGB tried to leverage against him. Grawonska was suspected of ties with Stasys Lozoraitis, the former foreign minister of pre-WWII independent Lithuania, who was the head of the anti-Soviet Lithuanian diplomatic service based in Rome. It is clear from the report that Grawonska was perceived by the KGB as more threatening and dangerous than Carrara.

Grawonska’s conduct in Vilnius is described by Tumantsev as highly provocative. According to him, in her conversations with the locals, she made many “libelous” comments about the Soviet government and the socialist system, while at the same time praising the benefits of the bourgeois capitalism. When she met with a Lithuanian Catholic priest, she gave him several copies of the booklet titled “Lithuania and Lithuanians in the Free World,” which Tumantsev condemned for its “anti-Soviet” orientation. Grawonska also irritated the KGB by demonstratively pointing to their external surveillance operatives and trying to escape them by taking a taxi to the suburbs. Most damningly from Tumantsev’s point of view, Grawonska took hundreds of photographs of the daily life in Vilnius. The KGB feared that she would use the photos to give an unflattering portrayal of the Soviet life in her subsequent articles in Western journals and newspapers. To prevent Grawonska from carrying out her ‘nefarious’ design, the decision was made to enter her hotel room and expose (destroy) her film rolls. The question that the KGB needed to work out was how to keep Grawonska away from her room long enough to do so.   

For the task of distracting Grawonska, the KGB engaged their agent and informer codenamed NEMAN [the name of the major river]. There is no indication in the report as to who NEMAN was, but it is likely that he was either a journalist or an art critic, somebody with a prominent role in the Vilnius cultural circles. According to Tumantsev, NEMAN was planted to Grawonska during her first visit to Vilnius in January 1960 and managed to gain her trust. He apparently impressed her so much that when she came to Vilnius again in February, she asked to see NEMAN and then introduced him to Carrara. Coached by the KGB, NEMAN invited both Grawonska and Carrara for dinner at the Vilnius Airport restaurant, quite a distance away from the hotel. Familiar with Carrera’s “weakness,” he also invited a well-known theater actress [or ballerina] to accompany them.

Tumantsev reported that the KGB team waited to receive a phone confirmation from their source at the airport that Grawonska and her companions made their dinner orders at the restaurant before two experienced operatives sprang into action. One operative was from the OTO [technical service] and the other from the 2^nd Directorate [counterintelligence]. Having obtained the key of Grawonska’s room from a trusted contact at the hotel, they entered the room and methodically exposed all the film rolls they could see lying around. They also discovered that one of Grawonska’s leather bags was tightly packed with about 100 film rolls. They took the bag to another hotel room where they had already brought a portable x-ray machine. When they exposed all the rolls, they returned the bag to the same place in Grawonska’s room. According to Tumantsev, the whole operation took about 2 hours. He noted that the agent NEMAN proved to be a real expert in keeping both Grawonska and Carrara entertained during the dinner, while adding that the warning system had been put in place in case they suddenly decided to return to the hotel.

There is nothing in the report regarding the epilogue of the operation. There is no mention of whether Grawonska noticed that her film rolls were damaged and, if so, how she reacted. For Tumantsev and his KGB unit, the operation was marked down as an unmitigated success.

The second operation Tumantsev described in his report involved the visit to Vilnius of two Japanese diplomats, the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, Hirooka, and the attaché at the Embassy, Tanaka [only their last names are included in the report]. This visit took place in June 1960. Tumantsev noted that before the visit, the Lithuanian KGB was informed by the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB [counterintelligence] that Hirooka was an experienced foreign intelligence officer fluent in Russian language and skilled in using various technical equipment for collecting information about the objects of interest to the Japanese government.

After Hirooka and Tanaka arrived in Vilnius, they were put under around-the-clock surveillance by the KGB. Tumantsev indicated that it was observed that Hirooka spent a lot of time at the hotel writing something in a thick notebook which he later deposited in his bag. The decision was made to gain access to the notebook. Once again, the question was how to keep Hirooka away from his room long enough to do so.

According to Tumantsev, in contrast to the case of Grawonska and Carrera, a different tactic was used this time. Instead of dining and wining the Japanese diplomats, the KGB engaged their agent TSAREV who was introduced to them as a translator and a tourist guide. Using his encyclopedic knowledge of history, TSAREV convinced the diplomats that the town of Trakai would be a great place to visit. Trakai is about 30 kilometers from Vilnius and has been a popular tourist destination for decades due to its medieval architecture. When the diplomats left for Trakai with TSAREV and the taxi driver, who was selected because he was also a trusted KGB contact, the KGB operative team entered Hirooka’s room. They quickly found the notebook and photographed its content which was in Japanese language. In total, there were 92 pages filled with writing, which, according to Tumantsev, were promptly dispatched to the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. It is also noteworthy that during the drive to Trakai, the taxi driver took the longest possible route, not only to allow more time for the hotel room search, but also to avoid passing near any Soviet military installations.

In conclusion, Tumantsev’s report is just one of many archival testimonies of the methodical nature and thoroughness of the spying on foreign visitors by the regional KGBs of the Soviet republics. As can be seen from the report, external surveillance and hotel room searches were quite common and most local individuals who foreign journalists and diplomats interacted with during their visits were planted by the KGB. Not only was the KGB ready and willing to violate the visitors’ right to privacy but was also on occasion engaged in damaging and destroying their property and equipment. Conveniently for the KGB leadership which wanted to hear only the good news, it seems that the reactions of the affected journalists and diplomats were rarely reported.

 

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[1] “Valstybės saugumo organų operatyvinio darbo patirties tyrimo ir apibendrinimo grupės prie LSSR KGB pirmininko vyr. referento N. Tumancevo pažyma apie asmenų sekimą [The Statement of N. Tumantsev, High-Ranking Officer of the LSSR KGB Operational Work Experience Research Unit, on the Surveillance of Individuals],” F. K-l, ap. 10, b. 275, 1. 73–77. Top Secret. Digitized on February 7, 2012, http://www.kgbveikla.lt/docs/show/261/from:665.

[2] Wanda Grawonska is a well-known Italian journalist. At this time, she is in her 90s and lives in Rome. Her father was a pre-WWII Polish diplomat Jan Grawonski and her maternal grandfather Alfredo Frassati was the founder of the Italian newspaper La Stampa.

Filip Kovacevic: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew About Yugoslavia

This short article is included in the 2021 Newsletter of the North American Society for Intelligence History (NASIH).

The Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania has digitized many volumes of top secret KGB in-house journals and published them on the Internet.[1] The aim of the journals was to inform the KGB officers about the latest developments in several fields related to state security, and they remain classified in Putin’s Russia to this day. In one of the journals, more precisely, in the volume No. 23 of the Proceedings of the Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB published in 1981, I came across an article about Yugoslavia.

The article with a long and cumbersome title - “The Use of the Territory and Citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] by the Intelligence Services of the Imperialist States to Conduct Subversive Activities Against the Soviet Union” – is signed by Major V. A. Tikhonenkov.[2]

 

The title already gives a sense of the KGB’s attitude towards Yugoslavia. In other words, though political and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia seemed to be on an upward trajectory at the time (in the late 1970s), the KGB approached Yugoslavia with a high degree of suspicion.

 

Tikhonenkov begins his article by claiming that, in comparative perspective, the U.S. intelligence service was the best positioned and most influential in Yugoslavia, though both the British and West German intelligence services were also very active. He asserts that the main priority of these services was to create roadblocks and tensions in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

 

According to Tikhonenkov, one of the ways that the Western intelligence services attempted to do so was to spread rumors that the Soviet Union would invade and occupy Yugoslavia after Tito’s death. In contrast, Tikhonenkov alleges that the exact opposite was the case: it was the West that worked on the disintegration of Yugoslavia by prodding Yugoslav republics to pull away from federal policies and institutions. In the case of Slovenia, for instance, Tikhonenkov claims that the Western intelligence services encouraged the development of strong economic ties with Western companies and banks. On the other hand, the strategy in Serbia was to advocate the need for a “broad democracy,” implicitly hinting that the ethnic rights of the Serbs living outside Serbia needed to be enhanced.

 

In addition, Tikhonenkov rejects the allegations of Western media directed at Yugoslavia at that time about the Soviet covert assistance of the nationalist émigré circles, the Croat émigré organizations in particular, in their explicit anti-Yugoslav political efforts. However, he does admit to his KGB audience that certain members of these organizations did contact Soviet embassies in Western Europe with offers of collaboration. But, according to him, all such offers were turned down.

 

Furthermore, Tikhonenkov claims that Western intelligence services regularly used the territory of Yugoslavia to recruit Soviet citizens who came from the Soviet Union, either on official business or as tourists. For example, he describes how some Yugoslav hosts, in collusion with their Western intelligence “mentors,” often invited Soviet diplomatic officials and Soviet scientists to private parties where “in the company of young women” they tried to persuade them to defect to the West. According to Tikhonenkov, in addition to the big cities, the coastline of  Montenegro was also used as a setting for similar recruitment attempts. For instance, he cites the case of a Soviet military ship’s visit to the Montenegrin port of Tivat in 1976 and claims that three Soviet sailors and one officer stated to the KGB counterintelligence after their visit that their Yugoslav hosts tried to convince them not to return to the ship and offered them assistance in emigrating to the West.

 

Tikhonenkov seems particularly vehement in his criticism of the alleged behavior of some Yugoslavs who had lived and worked in the Soviet Union and for whom, according to him, Soviet citizens had felt “sincere sympathy and friendship,” which they betrayed by secretly collecting valuable political, economic, military and other information for the Western, primarily U.S., intelligence services. In this context, he refers to the case of a former Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, though he does not reveal his name.

 

At the same time, however, considering the type and nature of the information Tikhonenkov appears to have accessed for his article, one gets a clear impression that the KGB also had its own sympathizers and sources high up in the Yugoslav government circles. Tikhonenkov might have provided a subtle hint about who they were when he cited positive statements made about the Soviet Union by Tito’s national security adviser Ivan Mišković and the Yugoslav federal secretary (minister) for internal affairs Franjo Herlević.

 

Interestingly, at the end of the article, Tikhonenkov also warns that after the visit of the Chinese Communist leader Hu Guofeng to Yugoslavia in 1978, it was to be expected that China too would become an active intelligence player in Yugoslavia and seek political allies for its anti-Soviet foreign policy goals.

 

In conclusion, the key takeaway from the article is that while the KGB counterintelligence did not discount the possibility of the Soviet Union improving political and economic relations with Yugoslavia in the near future, they still considered Yugoslavia an untrustworthy, “Trojan horse” of the West.

 

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[1] See “KGB Journals and Books,” The Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, https://www.kgbdocuments.eu/kgb-journals-and-books/.

[2] Майор В. А. Тихоненков, “Использование спецлужбами империалистических государств територии и граждан СФРЮ для ведения подрывной деятельности против Советского Союза,“ Труды Висшей Школы КГБ 23, 1981: 351-364.  

This is the revised English version of my article published in Monitor, an independent political weekly in Montenegro, in March 2021.