RIA Novosti: Interview of Tamara Netyksa, Veteran KGB Illegal Intelligence Officer

On March 6, 2020, the Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti published an interview of Tamara Netyksa who was declassified as a KGB/SVR illegal intelligence officer by the SVR director Sergey Naryshkin on January 28, 2020. Below is my English translation of the interview available only on this site.

Former Illegal Intelligence Officer Tamara Netyksa: While Undercover Abroad, They Would Declare Love to Me

RIA Novosti March 6, 2020

An unusual event in the history of Russian foreign intelligence took place in January of this year - the director of the SVR Sergey Naryshkin for the first time publicly named the names of seven illegal intelligence officers who made a great contribution to protecting the interests of Russia and ensuring its security. Among them - Hero of Russia, retired Major General Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Netyksa (1946-2011) and retired Colonel Tamara Ivanovna Netyksa (born in 1949). The Netyksa couple worked in Latin America from 1978 to 1998, in the countries with strict administrative and police regimes and under the conditions that involved a risk to life. While abroad, the couple had a son and a daughter. According to SVR, Tamara Netyksa “deliberately took justified risks in solving operational problems while working under intense pressure [and] provided effective assistance to her husband in intelligence activities under the special conditions.”

In this interview with RIA Novosti on the eve of International Women's Day on March 8, Netyksa explained how in the family of illegal intelligence officers the wife can assist the husband, why it is that the more the people in the foreign country know about you, the better, why one needs to know how to give gifts to the relevant people, and what is so special about the Russian borsch made in the Latin American manner.

- Tamara Ivanovna, intelligence experts have long known that being a female intelligence officer is by no means an auxiliary profession and that women in this matter are not only not inferior to men, but often perform much better. But it’s always interesting to hear what the women who have worked in intelligence themselves say about their special qualities and requirements, especially in the case of illegal officers.

- I’ll tell you what, in my opinion, the wife of an illegal officer should do if she is traveling to work with her husband on a long-term assignment. And it does not matter which country is involved.

There is nothing insignificant in our work, so the wife must be well-versed in all matters concerning illegal intelligence. If that is not so, then it is better for her not to go, [because] she will only create inconvenience to her husband.

The husband-wife couple is like a work-team, but the husband is always the leader. This is logical. My husband Talik would say, for example: "It is necessary to do so-and-so." And I would say: "I think we should do it like this." And he would answer: "You know, you're right." Or he would say: "No, we will do another way." He had the last word.

- What roles should a woman play in such a work-team?

- She must always bear in mind that the wife of an illegal intelligence officer will have to take responsibility for the birth and upbringing of children. Therefore, she must be in good health and be prepared for the birth of a child. For illegal intelligence officers, the presence of children is important, because the children “strengthen” the couple, make it, if I may say so, more real, make its position more grounded.

In addition, the wife of an illegal intelligence officer must be very well-versed in the means of keeping up the communication with the Center. Even if this part of the work is the responsibility of her husband, that’s important all the same - because at some point he might be busy, for example, he might go on a business trip, and you can’t remain without the communication channel. Therefore, the wife must know these things.

Another big issue concerns security. This issue is closely related to the work of the wife. [Here] the first component is security at home. A couple may have a household assistant - for example, a cleaning lady or, say, a nanny. And you have to be sure of the qualities of this person. This determination is made by the wife.

Secondly, every so often, intelligence officers need to conduct verification checks to be make sure that they did not attract the interest of the local counterintelligence. But the husband, as a rule, is very busy and, for example, he may not have the time to conduct a verification procedure. And, therefore, this is also the responsibility of the wife.

In addition, the wife should always look good, she should be very pretty. Illegal intelligence officers must take into consideration their numerous local acquaintances. Suppose you live in a house with a concierge and many neighbors. [And] on the street, there are a lot of shops. Everyone there knows each other, they constantly greet each other. And everyone knows you. And it is very important that everyone knows everything about you.

- And, in this way, to unwittingly support your cover?  So that there would be no blind spots regarding you and, as a result, no excessive interest in you or, God forbid, suspicions?

- Exactly! Ask our concierge there and she would tell absolutely everything about us. What kind of people we are, where we were born, what we do, what children we have, what we eat, how much we earn. If everyone knows everything about you, then you do not attract attention. And this is also the work of the wife.

Another very important issue is to know how to give gifts.

- Is that really very important?

- Of course! After all, you can give a person a gift and shock him by doing so.  

- And that is exactly what the intelligence officer should not do?

- Never. So, you need to be able to pick up an appropriate gift, maybe something made by yourself, so that the person likes it and does not wonder: "Why did they give it to me? Is there something behind it?"

Your home should be also very comfortable. It should always be in order. A guest can drop by at any moment, and he should feel welcome. The household issues - they are also the responsibility of the wife. But, of course, one must live modestly, without excesses.

- Tamara Ivanovna, you said that the wife of an illegal intelligence officer should be very pretty. But, looking at your photos with Vitaly Vyacheslavovich, I must say that you were not just an attractive, but also a truly beautiful couple.

- Well, it’s been a long time ago.

- It’d be difficult to find any representative of the “stronger sex” who would disagree. My question is this: Latin America is universally perceived as the place of hot-blooded romances, so how much did the local men come after you - well, they would definitely notice you, right? Did it interfere with your work?

- Of course, they were very attentive to me, there were even love declarations. But in no case did this interfere with my work. You must be able to control yourself.

- At one time, illegal intelligence officer Lyudmila Ivanovna Nuykina described how she and her husband celebrated our holidays abroad but were very carefully not to attract anyone's attention even with some unusual food aromas from the kitchen. For example, on March 8, she would delicately prepare dumplings [pelmeni]. Did you celebrate any holidays, and if so, how?

- We also celebrated our holidays. But I’ll say right away that I didn’t prepare dumplings. If I prepared a salad, for example, the Olivier salad [a very popular holiday dish in Russia], then I would do it in a different way. I had different ingredients abroad, [and] of course, I did not use any sausages. We didn’t have vodka, we never drank it there. We had champagne.

But, on the same floor [of the apartment building], there was a family of Russian descent, though they did not know a word of Russian. And the wife cooked borsch. Once she brought it to us to try. And it was completely cold!

- And she did not even suspect that in front of her, there was somebody who knew how a real borsch tasted?

- Yes. But we really liked that soup. And my daughter then asked me: "Make me that borscht." That's what she called it - “borscht.” I prepared it, but very rarely.

- At least in terms of that dish, you could, if need be, explain that you got the recipe from your neighbor.

- Of course. But there was never any need. We did not go beyond certain limits and did do anything risky. For all the years working abroad, Talik and I did not say a single word in Russian to each other.

But there was one such occasion. This was at the very beginning of our work when I spent some time with a local family. That was the only time in my life when before going to bed, instead of Spanish “buenos noches,” I said “good night” in Russian. But luckily no one noticed. And, probably, it was necessary for this to happen once so that I never made that mistake again.

- Tamara Ivanovna, what would you wish to say the girls who are recruited to serve in intelligence?

- The most important thing is patriotism. This is the foundation of everything and should be there, no matter what. It should be something deep in you. And I would also advise them to develop themselves in every way, to expand their horizons, their skills. They should know a lot and have many hobbies.

For an illegal intelligence officer, it is all the more necessary to know a lot, otherwise he will not do a good job. Just mastering the language perfectly is not enough – that’s like going abroad as a mere tourist.

Please understand, you must make people interested in you. This is the only way to establish contacts successfully. And [the only way] to keep your husband interested in you and proud of what you are doing.

 

Nikolay Dolgopolov: The Story of Zoya Zarubina, Veteran NKVD Intelligence Officer and Translator

Veteran journalist Nikolay Dolgopolov, now deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Russian state-owned daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, is one of the most popular writers on intelligence history in contemporary Russia. He has written the biographies of Kim Philby, Rudolf Abel (Viliam Fisher), Nadezhda Troyan, and Gevork Vartanyan. In early 2020, he published his memoir From Dolgopolov’s Notebook: From Francoise Sagan to Rudolf Abel.

Dolgopolov's text about Olga Zarubina was published in the April 14, 2020 issue of Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Below is my English translation available only on this blog.

Nikolay Dolgopolov: Intelligence in Zarubina’s Translation

Rossiyskaya Gazeta April 14, 2020

Intelligence Officer, Translator, Pedagogue Zoya Vasilyevna Zarubina would have turned 100 at this time

For half a century I was not at my alma mater, now Moscow State Linguistic University. So much has changed. They took me to a new building, showed me around, but I looked for that which was left over, for the old, the familiar. And, walking along the second floor, I stopped. Here in this corner was the location of the program for translators at the U.N. - the cherished dream of all translators of the country. The elegant, always well-dressed Zoya Vasilyevna Zarubina directed this program with her iron hand. She was the one who founded the program somewhere in the second half of the 1960s.

The program does not exist now. Gone is also Zoya Vasilyevna, who lived a long, difficult, interesting life, and died in 2009 at the age of 88. But Zarubina is remembered by everyone who has ever met her, listened to her lectures in excellent English, which was so different from the way we students spoke. She was both strict and benevolent, she beamed with confidence which she also inexplicably inspired in us as well, us, young people who dreamed of becoming translators. Looking at her, I felt - study hard, work hard, and you will certainly get what you want.

But something else was also present in this woman that was not there in the other professors of these tightly balanced 1970s. In those years of disciplined stagnation, and even in such a “travel-permitting” university [enabling graduates to go abroad], there was not a lot of gossip and intrigue. But almost everyone understood that, among the professors of foreign languages, there were also those who entered the rank of “teachers" [English in the original] from intelligence.

Sometimes something unusual was also heard about Zoya Vasilyevna Zarubina. Of course, no one could guessed, or had ever heard, that her father, Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin, a major general, was a station chief of [Soviet] intelligence in several countries, including the United States, and that her mother, Olga Georgievna, also worked undercover with him before the divorce. They took Zoya with them to different countries, and she involuntarily saw everything and learned a lot. Intelligence was almost in her genes.

And all this experience could not but turn Zarubina into a truly European woman, unusual for us at that time. Maybe we involuntarily reached out to her, since she had been behind the “Iron Curtain” and paved the road there for her young students.

She shared her experiences as an intelligence officer-translator with a few talented young people. She taught a special course for a narrow circle of those who could, if selected, follow in her footsteps. Some succeeded in doing so.

It is a pity that my acquaintance with Zarubina at the university did not last longer. I really wanted to attend the UN program. However, life took me in a different direction. I did not have the luxury of spending additional years at school. My parents retired, were frequently ill, and I went to Iran as a translator to earn money. Still, there was some talk of entering the “Zarubina’s circle.” My father knew her from Nuremberg, where young Zoe worked as a translator in the most important international legal process in history. He remembered that at rare evening parties arranged by the Soviet delegation, Zoya Zarubina danced beautifully. On the wall in our apartment, among various big and small paintings, hung a pencil sketch of the artist Zhukov, capturing many of those who were there at the time. My father was dancing with a young woman, and my mother, not without reason being jealous of my dad, was for some reason sure that this was that same beauty. It’s a pity, but when I left home for several years, the drawing disappeared without a trace.

Surprisingly, it turned out that after the university I was well acquainted with Zarubina’s daughter - Tanya Kozlova. We worked together as translators in the most “travel-permitting” institution of the former country — the Sports Committee of the USSR. Several times I went abroad with Tatyana, we had mutual friends. But never, never (again, genetics?) did Tanya tell me that she was Zarubina’s daughter, and that Zarubina’s stepfather was the famous general Leonid Eitingon, one of the main organizers of Trotsky’s assassination, who planned and carried out the most ingenious Soviet intelligence operations before and after the war. And who went to prison after the fall of Beria. Tanya even published a book with his letters from prison. Eitingon was, of course, later rehabilitated.

The Intelligence Work with Her Stepfather

Perhaps it was with her stepfather at a young age of seven that Zarubina completed her first serious mission. Eitingon served in China in 1927 when local and not at all peaceful inhabitants attacked our consulate. They pushed everyone into one room. And Eitingon, who worked under a diplomatic cover, quietly whispered to his stepdaughter: try to get into the apartment and take out the bundle hidden there. Zoya quietly slipped out of the dining room, reached the apartment in the consulate, where everything was turned upside down by the Chinese. She quickly found the package that remained untouched. And, calmly walking past the watchful Chinese guards, she gave it to Eitingon. In the possession of a gun that was wrapped in rags, everybody felt much safer.

In principle, there was nothing unusual in that situation. Intelligence officers of all countries and nations use children as cover. The heroes of my books on intelligence told me how the kids assisted them. For instance, people with children or with strollers are involuntarily everywhere perceived, if not with positive emotion, then at least with a certain degree of respect. The loss of vigilance on the part of counterintelligence is understandable. Some who worked under the cover of an embassy or trade mission admitted that they often transported, or handed over secret documents, hiding them in diapers or in a stroller. And this never failed.

Sportswoman, Translator, Intelligence Officer

As Zoya was growing up, she got into sports. She trained in the “Young Dynamo” Club, of course. She preferred athletics, she was a great runner.

She studied well and entered the prestigious IFLI - the Chernyshevsky Institute of Philosophy, Literature and Art, which was closed in 1941. This was a kind of the prototype of today's MGIMO and provided a brilliant education. In addition, she learned English when she was a child: in China, she went to an American school and so she did not have any Russian accent.

But the war came, and, after two years at IFLI, Zarubina made a firm decision: she wanted to go to the front. The army personnel officers did not let her – she was much too valuable to be a frontline soldier. Prior to studying at IFLI, she dreamed of becoming an intelligence officer. But her family dissuaded her: [they said] we already have too many intelligence officers. But the path to an intelligence career was open now. With her knowledge of English, French and German, where else could she go?

The Hostess in Tehran-1943

Some people who are in the know tried to convince me that she was not at the Tehran Conference. Her daughter Tanya was too small at the time to be left behind. But, at my request, those who truly know looked into her personal file: she was definitely there, but they could not go into details.

The good-looking lieutenant of state security (only a few knew that) Zoya Zarubina was in charge of the communications between the delegations of the USSR, the U.S., and Great Britain. She communicated with British Prime Minister Churchill, but mostly with the U.S. President Roosevelt, who lived in the Soviet embassy. The Americans considered her a kind of hostess, a mistress of the house.

Her activities as a hostess whose linguistic abilities the Anglo-Saxons were dependent on were not only limited to that. Such are the laws of her chosen profession. Zarubina did a lot of good, as noted (and most recently confirmed) by her official service record.

She had approximately the same duties at the conferences in Yalta, Potsdam, and at the Nuremberg Tribunal. True, in Nuremberg, some already knew that Zoya was mostly translating the documents that were of interest to our intelligence.

The Confrontation for the Non-Peaceful Atom

But, of course, Zoya Vasilyevna Zarubina was not only engaged in operational work. Who would have done the translations then? This became a burning question when top secret documents concerning nuclear issues began coming from the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada.

How to translate such documents was not taught at any university. Even the experienced technical translators were desperate. Academician Kurchatov, who led the Soviet atomic project, and was the only one who read all the translations, was not satisfied. Why did he get all that nonsense? And Zarubina was one of the first who, overcoming annoyance, strove to understand the unheard-of terminology. As many translators do, she compiled her own little dictionary. She talked to Kurchatov’s subordinates and tried hard to understand how it all fitted together. 

Hundreds and hundreds of pages of documents had to be translated into Russian. I suppose Zoya figured out that many of those that came from the U.S. went through her father, the station chief Vasily Zarubin. You cannot escape your fate. Intelligence was meant to be and did become a family affair [for her].

But the struggle against “cosmopolitanism” became the order of the day in the USSR. As a result of a purge, her stepmother was forced to leave intelligence. In 1948, her father was pushed into retirement. Then came the turn of her stepfather: he was imprisoned for a long time. Zoya Zarubina, a language teacher at the MGB [Ministry of State Security], was asked to cast aspersions on Eitingon. So what? Just think, your stepfather. The alternative: leaving the job. And, without any hesitation, Zoya Vasilyevna left.

But, as we know, she triumphed anyway. She became a professor. After several years of not being permitted to travel, the ban was lifted. She created her own language school: she organized the program for U.N. translators.

... That's what I recalled at my alma matter. Zoya Vasilyevna is remembered there. And not only there.

 

The Dossier Center: The FSB Price List for Hacking and Surveillance

In its well-researched, critical report on the activities of the FSB, the Dossier Center, an organization funded by the exiled Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, claims to have acquired a price list for the FSB services that violate Russian and international laws.  

Below is my English translation of this part of the report which includes the FSB price list for illegal services.

A Dossier source, who worked for the special service [FSB] (s9), stated that it is a widespread practice for the FSB to provide its services to private individuals on a commercial basis. In the cases like these, there are special price lists which enumerate the services such as, for example, providing information from non-public databases and wiretapping. The source gave the Dossier Center the copy of a price list enumerating some of the [illegal] services provided by the FSB.

General Information:

1.       A dossier of an individual - $100 (includes passport data, Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), Pension Insurance Personal Account Number (SNILS), information on property, vehicles, related individuals, share in legal entities and individual businesses, criminal records, police searches, income, as well as archival data, phone numbers, email addresses);

2.        An expanded dossier of an individual - $500 (includes the information listed in paragraph 1 as well as the information about the movements of this individual by any means of transport, loans, relatives, the numbers of all bank accounts, internal and international passports with photos).

Mobile communications, email, instant messengers:

1.   The printout of an individual’s phone calls indicating geolocation - $1,000–1,500 depending on the mobile service operator;

2.    Hacking an individual’s instant messenger and data upload - from $3,000;

3.     Hacking an individual’s email with ability to access it online - from $1,000 per month of access;

4.     Hacking social media accounts – from $300;

5.     Wiretapping and recording mobile phone conversations - $3,000 per day, seven days minimum;

6.      Determining the location of an individual during the period of 24 hours - from $1,000;

7.      Determining the owner of the phone number, as well as the IMEI number of the device, other phone numbers registered on the same person, the address of the owner of the phone number - from $100;

8.  Information whether an individual’s phone number is already under surveillance - $3,000.

Information from current databases:

A printout from any database of interest (including the databases of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Prison Service, the State Road Traffic Safety Inspectorate, the Federal Tax Service, the Civil Registry Office, the Federal Court Bailiff Service, the Federal Pension Fund, the Federal Registration Service, the Border Guard Service, Russian banks, and Interpol) - from $100.

Financial information:

1.       Every bank account number an individual has in all the banks of the Russian Federation - $100;

2.       The account balance - from $100 per account;

3.       All transaction flows – from $300.

The similar services are also provided for legal entities. According to the source, this practice is common in all FSB units which have access to shared databases. In addition to these services, it is also possible to obtain the external surveillance of a chosen individual. Most often, the FSB Operational Tracking Department is employed for this task.