The Titles of the PhD Dissertations Defended at the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB in 1981

 Blog Series: Reading Secret Journals of the KGB

Title: The Titles of the PhD Dissertations Defended at the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB in 1981

Compiled by Lt. Colonel N. I. Fedosenko

Publication: Volume 30, Papers of the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB, Moscow, 1983, pages 387-392. Classified as Top Secret. 

Translated by Filip Kovacevic, PhD

This list has never been officially declassified by the Russian government and is published here in English translation for the first time.

V. M. Avseyko, “The Struggle of the KGB against the Subversive Activities of the Intelligence Services and Other Organizations of the Federal Republic of Germany Involving the Soviet Citizens of German Nationality.”

A. P. Bakholdin, “The Ideological Diversion of the Intelligence Services of the Imperialist States Directed at the Unity of the Socialist Commonwealth.”

Yu. F. Baryshev, “The Socio-Typological Approach Applied to the U.S. Citizens in the Course of Counterintelligence Activities.”

L. I. Bushkov, “The Detection of Language Abilities in Adults and the Prediction of Successful Foreign Language Acquisition in the Educational Institutions of the KGB.”

P. S. Vasilkov, “The Struggle of the State Security Apparatus Against the Bourgeois-Nationalist Underground on the Territory of Latvia in the Post-War Period (1945-1952).”

V. I. Gryazin, “The Tactics of Interrogation of the Accused During the Investigation of the Highly Dangerous Crimes against the State.”

A. F. Krayushkin, “The Subversive Activities of the U.S. Intelligence Services Against the Soviet Union on the Territory of India.”

Yu. L. Klimenko, “The Interpersonal Communication with the West Germans During the Process of Recruitment by the State Security Apparatus.”

S. A. Kolosov, “Releasing from Criminal Penalties due to the Cessation of the Threat to State Security.” [Translated into plain language: prison release after agreeing to work for the KGB]

A. G. Kolzeyev, “The Concept of Treason via Defection Abroad and the Soviet Criminal Law.”

V. V. Muntyan, “The Anti-Soviet Intelligence and Logistics Activities of the Foreign Centers of Ideological Subversion and The Present Problems in Combatting Them by Soviet Counterintelligence.”

V. A. Miknevichus, “Using the Agents of Influence by Soviet Counterintelligence in Making an Impact on the Adversary.”

A. I. Repin, “The National Character of the Vietnamese and Its Special Features in Communication.”

Yu. V. Say, “The Ideological Diversion of the Adversary Against the Soviet Union Using the Revisionist Ideology and the Special Features of the Struggle Against It by the State Security Apparatus.”

A.A. Fastenkov, “The Use of Official Warning by the State Security Apparatus of the Soviet Union.”

S. M. Shvets, “The Informational Security of Coordination and Collaboration in the Activities of the Soviet Military Counterintelligence.”

V. F. Shmelev, “The Ideological Diversion of the Adversary Against the Border Guard Personnel and the Struggle Against It by the Special Departments of the KGB.”

 

The Titles of the PhD Dissertations Defended at the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB in 1980

Blog Series: Reading Secret Journals of the KGB

Title: The Titles of the PhD Dissertations Defended at the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB in 1980

Compiled by Lt. Colonel N. I. Fedosenko 

Publication: Volume 28-29, Papers of the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB, Moscow, 1983, pages 509-518. Classified as Top Secret.

Translated by Filip Kovacevic, PhD

This list has never been officially declassified by the Russian government and is published here in English translation for the first time.

P. Z. Borisenko, “The Participation of the KGB in the Prevention of the Hostile Ideological-Political Influences by the Adversary on the Soviet Citizens Through the Programs of Cultural Exchange.”

V. S. Goborov, “The Use of Operative Hypothesis in Establishing the Facts of Hostile Activities of the Individuals Under Surveillance.”

A. A. Guguev, “The Motivation for the Collaboration of the Individuals of Jewish Nationality Recruited by the KGB as Agents in the Struggle Against Zionism.”

V. M. Zorin, “The Training of the Agents of the KGB Counterintelligence Services.”

V. I. Klenov, “The Criminal Law Regulations in Japan Regarding the Protection of State Secrets.”

V. I. Kravtsov, “The Administrative-Legal Measures for the Protection of State Secrets in the Soviet Union and the Path to Their Improvement.”

G. V. Krisinel, “External Surveillance in Intelligence Operations.”

I. N. Kuksin, “The Limits of the Soviet Criminal Law and Their Impact on the Struggle Against the Subversive Activities of the Adversary.”

V. N. Mayorov, “The Current Problems in the Struggle of Soviet Counterintelligence Services against the Ideological Diversions of the Adversary Directed Against the Soviet Socialist Democracy.”

V. E. Ovchinnikov, “The Counterintelligence Search as a Type of Operation by the State Security Services in Exposing the Facts and Signs of the Subversive Activities of the Adversary.”

A. A. Ostroumov, “The Theory and Practice of Detection by the KGB Counterintelligence Services of the Enemy Agents Receiving One-Sided Radio Transmissions from the Intelligence Services of the Adversary.”

Yu. A. Penkov, “The Detection by the KGB Military Counterintelligence of the Espionage Activities of the Intelligence Services of the Adversary Aimed at the Collection of Information about the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces.”

M. E. Petrachkov, “The Formation of the American Espionage Network on the Territory of the Occupied Germany for the Intelligence Activities Against the Soviet Union.”

A. I. Petrenko, “The Socio-Psychological Aspects of the Interpersonal Relations Between the Intelligence Officer and the Agent.”

A. A. Petrov, “The Problems of the Moral Justification for the Relationship of Secret Collaboration between the Agents and the KGB Counterintelligence Services.”

A. M. Pivovarov, “The Assessment and Verification of the Initial Signals of the Possible Espionage Activities by Some Soviet Citizens.”

G. A. Popov, “Some Aspects of the Struggle of the Soviet State Security Against the Ideological Diversions against the Soviet Union by the Foreign Religious (Christian) Organizations.”

B. A. Romanov, “The Theory and Practice of the Formation of Goals and the Selection of Methods for the Espionage Penetration of the Adversary for Counterintelligence Purposes.”

V. I. Savelev, “The Set of Measures for the Struggle of the KGB Counterintelligence Against the Intelligence Services of the Adversary which Use Legal Opportunities for the Economic Relations with the Soviet Union for Intelligence Collection.”

I. M. Sazonov, “The Factors Influencing the Emergence of pro-Zionist and Anti-Soviet Views and Activities Among the Soviet Citizens of Jewish Nationality and the Measures to Counteract Them by the KGB.”

V. D. Sarayev, “The Psycho-Pedagogic Bases for the Operational-Technical Training of the External Surveillance Officers.”

G. N. Taygachev, “The Methodological Questions in the Study of the Subversive Propaganda of the Maoists.”

V. A. Tolkachev, “The Basic Methods for Making the Positive Effect on the Individuals Who Are Subject to the KGB Prophylactic Measures.”

A. M. Ukhal, “The Unique Features of the Recruitment of the Agents of the Soviet State Security among the Ukrainian Nationalists.”

V. P. Tsapenko, “The Detection and Investigation of the Substances for Secret Writing by Using the Method of Laser Mass Spectrometry.”

Filip Kovacevic: The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s - What KGB Counterintelligence Knew (4)

 Blog Series: Reading Secret Journals of the KGB

Title: On the Unique Features of the Subversive Activities by the Chinese Intelligence Services against the Soviet Union from the Territory of Xinjiang

Authors: Colonel G. Ya. Nikitin & Lt. Colonel A. A. Penkov

Publication: Volume 26, Papers of the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB, Moscow, 1982, pages 269-276. Classified as Top Secret.

Article Analysis by Filip Kovacevic, PhD

This article is written by the head of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB (counterintelligence) in the Kazakh Soviet Republic, Colonel Nikitin and his deputy, Lt. Colonel Penkov. They give an overview of the activities of the Chinese intelligence services in the Kazakh Soviet Republic in the 1970s and early 1980s and discuss a number of specific cases from their operative practice to illustrate the Chinese intelligence sources and methods. This article has never been officially declassified by the Russian government and is analyzed here in English for the first time.

As we have seen in the previous analyses of the KGB counterintelligence articles (see Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3), the proper form of a KGB journal article requires that it begins with a reference to the conclusions of the most recent Soviet Communist Party Congress. For Nikitin and Penkov, the most recent is the 26^th Party Congress held in February 1981 during which the Soviet leadership accused China of making an alliance with the Western powers to sabotage the Soviet Union and the unity of the Soviet-controlled Socialist bloc. Nikitin and Penkov take this statement as a starting point and claim that the aggressive Chinese anti-Soviet plans and geopolitical designs condemned at the Congress are reflected in the increasingly hostile activities of the Chinese intelligence services. They use the Chinese intelligence activities in the Kazakh Soviet Republic where they hold the two top positions in the KGB counterintelligence directorate as an illustrative case study.

According to Nikitin and Penkov, the rising interest of the Chinese intelligence services in the affairs of the Kazakh Soviet Republic can be observed since the early 1960s. Over the following two decades, the Chinese intelligence focus has expanded to include the information regarding the Soviet Kazakh military and border guard infrastructure, the economic situation and agricultural planning, the domestic and international political issues, the biographical data, sources, and methods of the KGB and MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) personnel, and the living conditions, attitudes, and moods of the Chinese diaspora. Nikitin and Penkov claim that the launching pad for the Chinese intelligence activities in the Kazakh Soviet Republic is the neighboring Chinese province of Xinjiang and set out to discuss these activities in detail and provide concrete examples. They reveal that their sources and methods include the counterintelligence activities against the Chinese intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover in the Soviet Union, the investigations and interrogations of border violators and defectors, the KGB active measures, and the KGB agent networks in the Chinese diaspora.

Nikitin and Penkov indicate that the favorite method used by the Chinese intelligence services to infiltrate their agents into the Soviet Union involves illegal border crossings. They note that the number of the border violators has steadily increased since the mid-1960s. They put their total number at more than 800 individuals since 1967 and give the exact figures for several years preceding the publication of their article: 69 violators in 1978, 72 violators in 1979, 89 violators in 1980, and more than 120 violators in 1981. They state that the violators come from several ethnic groups, including Han Chinese, Uighur, and Kazakh, and that those who turned up in the early 1980s were typically better educated and younger than the ones from the previous periods.

Nikitin and Penkov interpret this trend as a potential deceptive tactic by the Chinese intelligence services to facilitate the violators’ recruitment by the KGB and their subsequent return to China on KGB missions. They state that the violators appear to be very familiar with the Soviet legal system which allows them to remain in the country after serving a short prison sentence for illegal crossing. According to Nikitin and Penkov, this legal norm may facilitate the long-term Chinese intelligence operations within the Soviet Union and the deep cover infiltration of their agents into the Soviet state institutions, including the military and intelligence structures.

Nikitin and Penkov assert that the KGB counterintelligence activities in the Kazakh Soviet Republic in the period between 1978 and 1980 led to the exposure of more than 10 agents of the Chinese intelligence services among those who crossed into the Soviet Union illegally. They also provide several detailed case histories. The first one is the case of an individual codenamed “Nyui” (born in 1960) who was arrested in August 1980. After the KGB investigation, which included the information gathered by an informer placed inside his prison cell, “Nyui” confessed that he was trained by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) to offer his services to the KGB with the expectation of being sent back to China to work on the KGB behalf, thus comprising its espionage network there.

Another case from the same false defector category was the individual codenamed “Kin” (born in 1957) who was arrested the same year. “Kin” was also trained by the MSS but, in contrast to “Nyui,” was instructed to claim that he was an underground member of the Eastern Turkestan Revolutionary Party suppressed by the Chinese Maoist regime in 1969. He was to ask the KGB for the material assistance, including both money and weapons, to bring back to his alleged comrades hiding in Xinjiang and getting ready to rise up against the Beijing government.

According to Nikitin and Penkov, just like the MSS, the Chinese military intelligence service also trained false defectors. In this respect, they mention the case of an individual codenamed “Student” (born in 1958). “Student” admitted that he underwent special training in the Xinjiang Military District headquarters from May 1977 until September 1978 in order to become a deep cover agent within the Soviet Union. He was supposed to join the household of his relatives living in the Kazakh Soviet Republic and wait for a contact from China.

In addition, Nikitin and Penkov claim that the Chinese military set up small special forces units in the border areas to kidnap Soviet citizens. They discuss the case of a Kazakh shepherd (Soviet citizen but born in China in 1932) codenamed “Sputnik” who vanished in August 1978 while tending his livestock only to re-appear two months later. During the interrogation by the KGB counterintelligence, “Sputnik” admitted that he was recruited by the Chinese intelligence services. He revealed that he was subjected to intense psychological pressure and ordered to write personal, anti-Soviet statements until he acquiesced to become a spy. Nikitin and Penkov comment that such methods of “persuasion” have also been mentioned by other recruited Chinese-born Soviet citizens. They also note that the Chinese intelligence services often use the fact of these individuals having been born in China as the main rationale as to why they should assist them in their subversive activities. Moreover, Nikitin and Penkov state that the number of recruitment attempts rose in the late 1970s with the increase of Chinese citizens from Xinjiang visiting their family members in the Kazakh Soviet Republic and vice versa. However, they do not fail to mention that the Soviet Kazakh KGB counterintelligence keeps a close eye on the visitors from China and, no doubt, also tries to recruit them to serve the Soviet cause.

Lastly, Nikitin and Penkov claim that the Chinese military units from Xinjiang sometimes make incursions into the Soviet territory to test Soviet defenses. They note that several shootouts between the Soviet border guards and the Chinese soldiers occurred during the 1970s, including one in August 1971 when two Chinese soldiers were shot 17 km away from the border. A Russian-Chinese dictionary was found among their belongings, which Nikitin and Penkov interpret as a sign that they planned to collect intelligence by contacting local population. Nikitin and Penkov also note that the KGB special forces unit found a machine gun cartridge produced in West Germany in the Alaqol border region in June 1978, the indication not only of the presence of a Chinese military unit in that region, but also of the fact that it was armed by the Soviet Western adversaries. Along the same lines, they state that in 1981 the U.S. government provided China with spying equipment for the surveillance of Soviet missiles and radio communication which was positioned along the border in Xinjiang. [The same information was reported by the New York Times on June 18, 1981].

In conclusion, Nikitin and Penkov seem to be particularly wary of the ability of the Chinese intelligence services to recruit many who come into contact with them. They voice a strong suspicion even of some of their own agents who have returned after completing intelligence missions in Xinjiang. For instance, they write of the return of their agent codenamed “Un” in the summer of 1981. “Un” was sent to Xinjiang in 1971 and returned ten years later with three of his relatives. Nikitin and Penkov state that the KGB investigations show that there is a cause for serious concern that both “Un” and one of his relatives have been doubled by the Chinese intelligence.

Thus, in the final analysis, not only are the Chinese intelligence services increasing the number of agents they send into the Soviet Union, but they also seem to be successful in turning some of the KGB’s own. They are, in the words of Nikitin and Penkov, an adversary both “aggressive and insidious” for whom the KGB counterintelligence had yet to find an antidote.

 

Filip Kovacevic: The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s - What KGB Counterintelligence Knew (3)

 Blog Series: Reading Secret Journals of the KGB

Title: Some Questions Regarding the Subversive Activities of Chinese Intelligence Services Directed Against the Military Forces of the USSR

Author: Major A. A. Karyaev

Publication: Volume 15, Papers of the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB, Moscow, 1978, pages 130-145. Classified as Top Secret.

Article Analysis by Filip Kovacevic, PhD

This article was published two years prior to the articles by Captain Kuznetsov and Major General Kovalenko & Colonel Ponomaryov analyzed in Part 1 and Part 2. In contrast to those two articles, which are based on the files of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB (counterintelligence), Karyaev bases his article on the files of the Third Main Directorate of the KGB (military counterintelligence). However, as we will see, his conclusions are not much different. Chinese intelligence services are perceived as a formidable adversary whose methods and sources are a persistent source of concern for the KGB. Just like the two previous articles, this article has never been officially declassified by the Russian government and is analyzed here in English for the first time.

Karyaev begins by referring to the conclusions of the 25^th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (held in 1976) which stated that the Chinese Communist leadership had shifted ideologically to the right and became openly hostile to the Soviet Union. According to Karyaev, China now perceives the Soviet Union rather than the capitalist countries of the West as the “main adversary.” Consequently, China is using the “whole arsenal” of intelligence methods and tools to undermine the Soviet internal political stability and the Soviet reputation in the international community, especially among the socialist countries of the world. The significant targets in this covert intelligence war are the military forces of the Soviet Union. Karyaev claims that the situation is particularly acute in the regions bordering China and he mentions the Soviet Far East, the Baikal region, Siberia, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics.

According to Karyaev, the Chinese intelligence services are collecting all types of information regarding the Soviet military forces (the number of units, equipment, location, personnel, morale). They also focus on the military transportation and communication networks, training, and civil defense organization. Karyaev specifically refers to the April 1976 Chinese intelligence requirement which stressed the importance of obtaining the information regarding the location of Soviet military units and their movements and supply lines in the border regions. According to him, the espionage effort against the Soviet military forces is directed by the Military Council of the Chinese Communist Party and the Second Directorate of its Department of Investigation, but he also notes the involvement of the PLA’s Directorate for Intelligence, the Ministry of State Security, and the border guard intelligence units.

Karyaev emphasizes that in its spying activities directed against the Soviet military forces, the Chinese intelligence services are using both legal and illegal human platforms. He notes that the Chinese intelligence officers under diplomatic cover often travel to the Soviet border regions attempting to engage in the visual reconnaissance and photographing of Soviet military infrastructure and transport and communication lines. This for instance was found to be the case during the visit of Chinese diplomats to Khabarovsk in the mid-1970s. Likewise, during the Chinese diplomats’ visit to the Turkmenistan Military Region, they extensively questioned a Soviet officer codenamed “Narymov” about the military units based in the region, including military hospitals, the age, salaries, and ethnic composition of the personnel, and even about the visits of the Minister of Defense. Conveniently for the KGB, “Narymov” was actually an officer of the Third Main Directorate. Karyaev does not say so, but it is likely that “Narymov” was used to feed the disinformation to the Chinese.

Karyaev states that the surveillance of the Soviet military forces by the Chinese diplomats extends beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. He points to the increased Chinese diplomatic activities around the Soviet military infrastructure in all areas of the world in which the Soviet military maintains its presence, from Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia) to Africa. For instance, he brings up the example of the Soviet navy ships anchored in the Somaliland port of Berbera being photographed from a car with the Chinese diplomatic license plates.

Another setting favored by the Chinese intelligence services is the Moscow-Beijing railroad. According to Karyaev, the Chinese intelligence officers often work under the cover of train conductors. In addition to the visual reconnaissance of the places that the railroad passes through, they also try to strike up conversations and make friends with the travelers, especially Soviet military officers and their families, including children. After establishing contact, they tend to invite their new acquaintances to their official compartment and offer them fruits, gifts, cigarettes, etc. Karyaev mentions the case of a Soviet officer who accepted the invitation and was questioned about his personal affairs as well as about political and military matters.

In addition to having officers operating under a legal cover, the Chinese intelligence services run the long-term (future-oriented) illegals programs where they try to infiltrate their officers into the Soviet Union using illicit means. Referring to the testimonies of those he calls bona fide Chinese intelligence defectors, Karyaev claims that the Chinese intelligence leadership used mass border migration into the Soviet Union as a convenient cover for its illegal intelligence officers. According to the exposed Chinese officer codenamed “Khuan,” the Ministry of State Security began a systematic training of its illegal officers for operating in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s. The training lasted from one to three years and included both general and special subjects. The officers came from both the Han Chinese ethnic group as well as from the ethnic minority groups. Karyaev tells a story of another exposed Chinese officer referred to as D. who entered the Soviet Union illegally and then traveled through Kazakhstan collecting military-type information until he was arrested.

According to Karyaev, in recent times, the Chinese military has begun training special forces units called “the Tigers” and preparing them for the anti-Soviet sabotage activities. Karyaev claims that these actions represent a real threat to the Soviet border military infrastructure and warns that they need to be taken seriously. In addition, Karyaev notes that the Chinese military has dramatically increased its capabilities regarding technical and SIGINT intelligence collection by purchasing the optical and radio equipment from West Germany and other Western countries. This makes it quite capable of eavesdropping on Soviet border military exercises as well as on missile and satellite launches.

In conclusion, Karyaev advises a high degree of vigilance and offers some hope that the KGB counterintelligence will be able to act quickly to limit any damage that the Chinese intelligence services might cause. However, there is also a sense that the Chinese espionage pressure will intensify over time and will put a very heavy strain on the KGB resources, perhaps even comparable to the strain of Western intelligence services. The most unsettling for Karyaev and the KGB seems to be the realization that China and the West are now on the same geopolitical side and that their intelligence activities have the similar anti-Soviet core orientation. They know well that to fight on two fronts in the global spy war is daunting and generally leads to defeat.

 

Filip Kovacevic: The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s - What KGB Counterintelligence Knew (2)

 Blog Series: Reading Secret Journals of the KGB

Title: Some Contemporary Tendencies in the Subversive Activities of the Chinese Intelligence Services Against the USSR

Authors: Major General A. G. Kovalenko & Colonel B. I. Ponomaryov

Publication: Volume 21, Papers of the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB, Moscow, 1980, pages 447-456. Classified as Top Secret.

Article Analysis by Filip Kovacevic, PhD

This article is published in the same volume as the article by Captain Kuznetsov analyzed in Part 1 and their titles sound somewhat similar. Written by high-ranking KGB counterintelligence officers Major General Kovalenko and Colonel Ponomaryov, the article offers additional information regarding Chinese intelligence activities not available in Kuznetsov’s article, including the detailed discussion of two cases of Chinese espionage on the Soviet territory in the 1970s. It has never been officially declassified by the Russian government and is analyzed here in English for the first time.

Kovalenko and Ponomaryov begin by claiming that the Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s has an explicitly anti-Soviet, expansionist, and aggressive character. They dismiss the significance of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations which took place in Moscow in September 1979, sarcastically commenting that their only lasting consequence will be the increase of the Chinese intelligence presence at the Chinese Embassy. They claim that during the period of the negotiations, the number of Chinese personnel at the Embassy increased by 25 percent (from 150 to 200) among whom they suspect at least 30 intelligence officers. In addition to the traditional collection and recruitment activities, they assert that these officers are also interested in looking for ways to subvert the Soviet state from the inside.

Just like Kuznetsov, Kovalenko and Ponomaryov point to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow as the control post of Chinese espionage in the country. They claim that the Embassy personnel engages in the following intelligence activities: the collection of political, economic, military, and scientific-technical information; the collection of rumors and similar information that could be used as “ideological diversion” against the Soviet state in international forums; the coordination of intelligence networks and agents within the country; the monitoring of the Soviet media (they allege that the Chinese acquired the special equipment for recording Soviet TV programs from West Germany); the overall recruitment efforts (including those directed at foreign journalists and diplomats in the USSR, especially those from the so-called developing countries); the supplying of equipment and providing support to the Chinese intelligence officers who are operating without the official cover (illegals). They also emphasize that the Embassy has purchased the vast number of Soviet publications, spending about 4,500 rubles a year on Soviet newspapers and journals and about 160,000 rubles a year on books and specialist publications [In 1979, 1 ruble was equivalent to $1.52].

In addition, Kovalenko and Ponomaryov note that since 1971, the Chinese diplomats based at the Embassy resumed the so-called intelligence collection trips across the USSR halted during the Cultural Revolution. They report that two Chinese diplomats, one of whom was identified as the Chinese assistant military attaché, took a trip to Kishinev, Kiev, and Kharkov in October 1978. The two were observed trying to conduct the surveillance of military objects in Moldova and Ukraine. They also questioned local inhabitants (some of whom were KGB informers) about the size of military units and various industries in the region. Another pair of diplomats took a trip to Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Sukhumi in January 1979. They were actively collecting political and economic information in their meetings with local officials. According to Kovalenko and Ponomaryov, they also engaged in explicitly anti-Soviet, subversive activities by telling their interlocutors in the Caucasus that they would be better off if they “liberated themselves” from the Moscow “pressures” and “Russification” efforts. 

Kovalenko and Ponomaryov also describe an espionage case linked to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow in the 1970s. They tell a story of the Chinese agent codenamed “Scorpio,” a Chinese national who immigrated to the USSR in 1955 with a wife who was a Soviet citizen. According to Kovalenko and Ponomaryov, “Scorpio” was recruited by the Chinese intelligence officers at the Embassy after more than a decade-long period of testing and meetings. In 1972, he was told to apply for Soviet citizenship claiming that he was an ethnic Uzbek and then buy a house in the south of Ukraine (probably in the Crimea) near a major ship-building center on the coast. The Embassy supplied him with the necessary funds and he was told to begin collecting economic, military, and scientific-technical information. He was supposed to maintain the contact with the Embassy through a Chinese citizen who lived in Moscow and frequented the Embassy events. He himself was never to visit the Embassy again or to go to China in the next 15 years. Kovalenko and Ponomaryov do not say how and when “Scorpio” was caught, but what they do reveal shows the high-level of sophistication of the Chinese intelligence efforts. The case illustrates the Chinese intelligence officers’ slow and painstaking work to recruit the agent and then engage him in a complex and multi-leveled operation with the elements of a genuine spy thriller.

The second espionage case described by Kovalenko and Ponomaryov also resembles an elaborate spy adventure story. It concerns the case of a Chinese intelligence officer codenamed “Tsun.” In 1973, “Tsun” was arrested for illegally crossing the border between the USSR and China. He stated that he wanted to immigrate into the USSR in search of a better life and was released after serving a short prison sentence. Soon afterwards, however, he began to engage in intelligence collection activities both within the Chinese immigrant community and on his own by travelling to Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in a personal vehicle and monitoring military and heavy industry locations. When he felt that the KGB counterintelligence was closing in on him, “Tsun” attempted to flee by stealing a boat on the river Amur but was arrested before being able to cross into China. The information in his possession was found to contain Soviet state and military secrets and he was sentenced to 7 years in prison in 1974. Kovalenko and Ponomaryov use this case to emphasize the seriousness of the Chinese intelligence efforts in the border region between the two countries. They also add that these efforts involve air and radio surveillance and that the Chinese border guard and trade delegations’ meetings with the Soviets as a rule include intelligence officers on the lookout for recruiting disgruntled Soviet citizens. (One of such cases was described by Kuznetsov).

Kovalenko and Ponomaryov also allege that the efforts of the Chinese intelligence services are also directed at subverting the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan which, at the time of their writing, was in its initial stages. They state that China is training special forces and undercover officers in the Xinjiang region with the aim of sending them into Afghanistan to assist the anti-Soviet groups. Moreover, they claim that the Chinese intelligence in Afghanistan has established contacts with the CIA reflecting the geopolitical “collusion” between the “imperialists” and the Chinese Communists on the international level.

As we can see, Kovalenko and Ponomaryov’s article does not differ from Kuznetsov’s in terms of perceiving the Chinese intelligence activities within the USSR in the 1970s as a serious and complex threat to the Soviet state. They do seem to be more eager to boast of the KGB counterintelligence successes, but this is hardly surprising considering that their military rank is much higher and their leadership stakes greater than Kuznetsov’s. Still, even they admit that in order to address fully the challenges of the Chinese intelligence activities, the improvements in both Chekist theory and practice are necessary.