The Chekist Monitor

Interview Introduction: Known as one of the world’s leading research scholars in Russian and Soviet intelligence history, we are very honored to have Dr. Kovacevic in this month’s Intelligence Education Interview Series. In this compelling interview, Dr. Kovacevic discusses his professional and academic path providing insight into his expertise and journey of documenting Russian and Soviet Intelligence history, and his latest works including the article “Resisting the KGB Mythmakers: Willy Fisher, Spy Fiction, and the Myth of Rudolf Abel” (2024), and provides insight into his highly anticipated book for 2025, KGB Literati: Spy Fiction and State Security in the Soviet Union (forthcoming with the University of Toronto Press in October 2025).

As an avid reader of Dr. Kovacevic’s various works, some of which are available on his website, The Chekist Monitor, I was thrilled to attend his recent lecture, “Soviet/Russian State Security PR Projects from Lenin to Putin”, and am eager for him to share his area of expertise with our readers. Dr. Kovacevic, we thank you once again for participating in the Intelligence Education Interview Series and hope that your research impact in the field of intelligence studies will inspire our members, as you have inspired me and so many others in your more than two-decade-long university teaching career.

Question 1). Let’s start with the basics. How would you like to present yourself to the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE)?

I consider myself an innovative and meticulous researcher and a discoverer of the unknown about the little-known through open and archival sources of information. I am committed to bringing out the intentionally obscured and hidden voices from the past into our contemporary discourse in intelligence studies. We can learn so much from historical research because of the repetitive patterns in intelligence and counterintelligence practices and the unbroken continuities in intelligence cultures. My work is focused on revealing and writing about the up-until-now unknown operations and personnel from the KGB files. The details of such operations are jealously guarded by the current masters in the Kremlin – all former KGB officers – and so what I do is not without a certain amount of risk.

Question 2). Can you share with our readers what inspired you to pursue the field of intelligence?

I like to uncover secrets, and there are so many in the secret world of spies and counterspies. It’s like being an archeologist. Your focus is on documented stories rather than artifacts in the ground. However, you have to dig and dig and travel around the world to find all the clues to complete the puzzle. Every intelligence story is like a puzzle, and it’s rare that you can find all the missing pieces. However, some of the documents I uncovered have never been heard about before. For instance, I discovered the transcript of a meeting of KGB counterintelligence leadership in 1955. The top-ranking KGB generals, who were just names up to that point, began speaking in their own voice. You could even discern their character traits from the way they articulated certain things.

My analysis of this transcript was later published by the Wilson Center, and interested readers can find it here:

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/inside-look-soviet-counterintelligence-mid-1950s.

Question 3). Dr. Kovacevic, you have extensive experience in the field, both professionally as a geopolitical analyst and academically as a professor. Can you share with our readers what makes a great analyst?

Intellectual curiosity and willingness to incorporate new insights into whatever you are analyzing. Ideological fixation is the death of all accurate analysis. You’ve got to be open for the unexpected. And you will be surprised. Things are rarely what they seem on the surface. Intelligence officers are excellent manipulators of the human mind, so you’ve got to be careful not to fall into their trap.

Question 4). On the importance of documenting Russian and Soviet intelligence history, what role would you say these pieces play in modern-day intelligence studies?

They play a very important role because the current Russian intelligence culture is a close reflection of the Soviet KGB intelligence culture. The personnel names are different, but the anti-foreigner (not only anti-Western) orientation and conspiratorial mentality have remained the same. Many of the current SVR and FSB officers had their fathers and grandfathers (and sometimes even their mothers and grandmothers) employed in the KGB. So we have direct family lines going back into the past. In addition, the educational institutions and operational teaching materials created by the KGB have stayed basically unreformed in post-Soviet Russia, and that is why I am currently engaged in a significant investigative study of KGB educational practices. The Chekists – the collective self-designation of Soviet and Russian state security and intelligence officers - still aspire to change the world and model it in their own image, which is neither democratic nor liberal.

Question 5). Dr. Kovacevic, you have over twenty years of experience as an educator. How do you see the future of intelligence and analysis, and how should educators orient themselves? (for example, curriculum).

I am optimistic about the future of intelligence analysis in the West, but, of course, safeguards need to be put in place to prevent the corrosive influences of contemporary political polarizations from seeping into the intelligence community. Western intelligence and counterintelligence officers must be committed to seeking objective truth rather than to any political party affiliation. The same goes for intelligence educators. We need to be guiding lights for our students and teach them the importance of empathy and working together to confront both internal and external challenges. And it is likely that there will be many challenges in the years ahead. Not only violent conflicts and wars, but also potentially new diseases and catastrophic weather patterns leading to mass population displacements.

Question 6). In your most recent publication, the research article “Resisting the KGB Mythmakers: Willy Fisher, Spy Fiction, and the Myth of Rudolf Abel” (2024), you detail the life and myth surrounding Soviet intelligence officer Willy Fisher and the extensive efforts by the KGB to bury him under the name of Rudolf Abel. Can you share with our readers what your study reveals regarding the Soviet Union and its intelligence officers?

One of the major insights from this study is that for Soviet and Russian intelligence officers, no matter how accomplished certain individuals may be (and Fisher-Abel was one of their most successful spies), they are still just cogs in the machinery of state security and must be forced to think of themselves as such. And if they want to voice their independence and assert their autonomy, even minimally, they get crushed by their colleagues. For instance, Willy Fisher was even buried under the false name of Rudolf Abel (the name of his Soviet intelligence colleague and friend who died earlier) and it was only after the desperate protests of his wife and daughter that the KGB chairman Yuri Andropov allowed the addition of his real name to the fake name on his tombstone.

Question 7). What work do you believe most represents your professional life, and what can future analysts, researchers, and intelligence practitioners learn from it? (For example: documenting Russian and Soviet Intelligence history, can you share the most valuable lessons you have learned from documenting these pieces of history? And what motivated you to create the Chekist Monitor?

I don’t think I can point to any work in particular but invite the readers to read all of my research works in their totality. What they will learn is that Russian intelligence and counterintelligence services are a serious and dangerous adversary, but also that they are not without their weaknesses. And their biggest weakness is their toxically hierarchical interpersonal relations. The respect for individual accomplishments is not emphasized, and the collective is put far above the individual. And they are brutal in dealing with dissent, both internally and externally.

The reason I created The Chekist Monitor was to share interesting vignettes and episodes from my ongoing archival research with my readers. I like to tell the secret tales from KGB archives and found this digital outlet to be the most convenient way to do so.

Question 8). What advice or suggestions would you give our readers/students who are interested in the field of intelligence? Where should they start?

My main suggestion is to start in the archive, in any archive of any intelligence service. There are digital archives with thousands of unexplored declassified documents—the CIA Crest, the FBI Vault, etc. Also, become an avid filer of the Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests. Though my experience with FOIA is mixed, and sometimes it literally takes several years to get any documents from intelligence agencies, you never know what will come your way. Remember that primary sources are the sine qua non of any good research. Everything else is derived and dependent on somebody else’s interpretation. Be your own person in your investigations. Discover your own archival treasure.

Question 9). Dr. Kovacevic, in your highly anticipated book KGB Literati: Spy Fiction and State Security in the Soviet Union (forthcoming in October 2025). Can you share with our readers what lessons you hope they will take with them when reading your book?

My book is about spy fiction written by KGB officers, and it is the first book on this subject matter in any language, including Russian (and I hope it will be translated worldwide). Why is the focus on spy fiction by intelligence officers so important? It is not just entertainment, but it can also illuminate the work of clandestine government organizations and their relations to the societies where they operate in very vivid and intricate ways. At this particular time, spy fiction written by KGB officers is especially relevant because it reflects KGB mentality, norms, and values –in other words, KGB culture – and the present-day Russia is run by former KGB officers. Therefore, analyzing KGB spy fiction can provide relevant insights into understanding the motivations and goals of contemporary Russian foreign and security policies and actions. KGB Literati will be published by the University of Toronto Press, and I invite readers of this interview to read it and send me their feedback.

Question 10). Lastly, can you share with us five keywords that represent you?

Curiosity, innovation, courage, persistence, and pedagogy.

Sunday, March 23, 2025

Filip Kovacevic: Who Shot Lieutenant Podrezov?

“Remember that what you are told is really threefold: shaped by the teller, reshaped by the listener, concealed from both by the dead man of the tale.” --- Vladimir Nabokov

It was mid-February 1945 in northwestern Lithuania. World War Two had entered its final phase. The Soviet Red Army was fighting the retreating German forces. The dense forest areas between the towns of Šiauliai and Telšiai were patrolled by the military units of the Second Baltic Front. The Front's headquarters of the Soviet military counterintelligence directorate known as the SMERSH (Russian acronym for “Death to Spies”) reported the capture of a group of suspected German spies.

One of the unnamed captives carried the identification documents of a Soviet infantry officer, Lieutenant Aleksey G. Podrezov.[1] Podrezov had been missing since November 1944. He had left his unit on a 10-day leave and never returned. What happened to him? The Soviet military prosecutors of the 3rd Air Army opened an investigation.

The basic biographical details on Podrezov were easily obtained. He was born in Ukraine, in the Dnipro (Dnepropetrovsk) region in 1919.[2]. He had general education (seven grades) and was recruited into the Red Army in 1939. In uniform from the first day of the war, Podrezov became a candidate for membership in the Komsomol in 1942. He then completed an officers’ course which led to his promotion to lieutenant in 1944. He seemed a promising young man rising up the ladder of Soviet military hierarchy in wartime conditions.

Another document offered a more detailed account of the last year in Podrezov’s life.[3] On April 2, 1944, Podrezov reported for service in the 47th Infantry Division and was named the head of a mortar battalion in the Division's 148th Regiment on the same day. About three months later, on June 27, 1944, he was wounded in battle and then dispatched to a hospital in the rear for recovery and recuperation.[4] The wound must have been serious considering that Podrezov returned to his regiment only a couple months later. It seems that his troubles began after his return. Had his attitude toward the military service and the war in general undergone a dramatic change?

The first indication that something was amiss was the fact that he was not re-appointed to his previous position as the head of a mortar battalion. Instead, he was put in charge of the burial unit, a much lower and generally disliked post. Angered, or perhaps suffering from some kind of physical anguish, Podrezov apparently did not do a good job even at this lowly post and was relieved of command on October 10.[5]

Obviously wanting to get out of the unpleasant situation, Podrezov requested a 10-day leave from the regiment commander, Major Vasily Marushkov. He reportedly told Marushkov that he was going to visit his uncle who served as a colonel in the headquarters of the First Baltic Front. Marushkov approved the request but the documents certifying his decision appeared to have been lost or destroyed.

Given that the identity of Podrezov’s uncle was never established, it is possible that he was invented by Podrezov as an excuse to leave his unit. Evidently, military investigators also had their suspicions and required Marushkov to report all he knew about Podrezov’s request. In order to assess potential favoritism or corruption, they also obtained Marushkov’s personal information.[6] Nothing improper was found.

In his hand-written report, Marushkov stated that he reported Podrezov’s absence to his superiors at the end of November but was told that Podrezov had probably stayed with his uncle at the headquarters.[7] Nobody seemed overly concerned that Podrezov was missing. It is likely that they did not want him back anyway. But would they go so far as to plan, execute, and cover up his death? They had the know-how, they had the means, but did they really do it?

The account of the last hours of Podrezov’s life was provided by a Lithuanian villager Simonas Skotis. According to Skotis, on January 28, 1945 (more than two months after leaving his unit), Podrezov appeared at his farm in the woods near the small village of Luoke (Lukniki) in the company of two “unidentified” individuals dressed as soldiers of the Red Army.[8] The three said they were members of the Luoke NKVD (state security) unit. While at Skotis’s house, they began to drink heavily and, according to Skotis, Podrezov used his gun to force a female inhabitant (referred to in the report as an “unidentified female citizen”) to drink with them. Skotis was silent as to whether this aggressive action led to any subsequent sexual violence. He only stated that after their bout of drinking was over, Podrezov and one of the soldiers left for another farm in search of a certain sergeant Shvetsov who supposedly lived there.

This was when things took a strange turn. According to Skotis, soon after Podrezov and the soldier left, the remaining soldier exited the house and began waiting for the two to come back in a sort of ambush. When he saw them returning, he fired on Podrezov, killing him at the spot. The soldiers then took Podrezov’s gun and field bag, ripped off his shoulder straps, and vanished.

To what extent was Skotis’s testimony reliable? Major Levin, a Soviet military prosecutor reviewing the case, must have had his doubts, given that he expressed his surprise that no additional witnesses were interrogated.[9] Skotis could have easily been suspected to have been an accomplice to the murder of a Soviet officer. Yet, he was let go without any sanctions. It looked as if he had been protected by local authorities who first reported Podrezov’s death to the Soviets. He was likely an informer who was still needed for future covert work.

Interestingly, in his account, Skotis mentioned that only Podrezov took an aggressive action against a woman in his house and said nothing about his two companions. Were they just passive observers, or was he trying to make Podrezov - who, being dead, could offer no rebuttal - look as bad as possible, almost deserving of his tragic fate? Perhaps Skotis was afraid that those two “soldiers” would come back and take their revenge on him if he revealed too much to the investigators.

But who were these “soldiers”? Their identity was never discovered. Major Levin closed the case without having the answer. He only recommended that those in Podrezov’s regiment who had failed to report his absence to the headquarters be reprimanded.[10] He did not say a word about continuing the search for the killers.

Were they really NKVD, or were they in fact Lithuanian anti-Soviet resistance fighters dressed up as NKVD to fool a Soviet deserter roaming the woods, who was as afraid of his own as of the enemy? Most likely, they were the resistance fighters. Still, after having reviewed the case, I can’t shake off the impression that Podrezov was an inconvenient witness to both sides.

NOTES

^{^[1]} “Спецсообщение начальнику Управления контрразведки ‘СМЕРШ’ 2-го Прибалтийского фронта [Special Report to the Head of the Directorate of Counterintelligence ‘SMERSH’ of the 2^nd Baltic Front,” February 21, 1945. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, p.109. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution. I gratefully acknowledge the Hoover Institution Library & Archives as an essential resource in the development of these materials. The views expressed in this publication are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, staff, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

^{^[2]} “Справка на б/служащего проходившего службу в 148 стрельковом полку лейтенента Подрезова Алексея Георгиевича [Information on the former service member serving in the 148^th Rifle Regiment Lieutenant Podrezov Aleksey Goergiyevich], February 17, 1945. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, p.119. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution. Another document stated that he was born in 1917. See “Справка [Information], February 17, 1945. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, p.118. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution.

^{^[3]} “Справка [Information], February 16, 1945. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, p.117. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution.

^{^[4]} “Справка на б/служащего проходившего службу в 148 стрельковом полку лейтенента Подрезова Алексея Георгиевича [Information on the former service member serving in the 148^th Rifle Regiment Lieutenant Podrezov Aleksey Goergiyevich], p.119.

^{^[5]} “Спецсообщение начальнику Управления контрразведки ‘СМЕРШ’ 2-го Прибалтийского фронта [Special Report to the Head of the Directorate of Counterintelligence ‘SMERSH’ of the 2^nd Baltic Front,” p.109.

^{^[6]} “Справка на начальника штаба 148 СП майора Маружкова Василия Михайловича [Information on the chief of the stuff of the 148^th Rifle Regiment Major Maryshkov Vasily Mikhailovich],” February 17, 1945. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, p.111. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution.

[7] “Сообщение начальнику УК ‘СМЕРШ’ 47 СД [Report to the head of the Directorate of Counterintelligence ‘SMERSH’ of the 47^th Rifle Division],” February 17, 1945. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, pp.110, 110 reverse. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution.

[8] “Спецсообщение начальнику Управления контрразведки ‘СМЕРШ’ 2-го Прибалтийского фронта [Special Report to the Head of the Directorate of Counterintelligence ‘SMERSH’ of the 2^nd Baltic Front,” p.109 reverse.

[9] “Военному прокурору 6-й гвардейской армии – гвардии подполковнику июстиции тов. Нельсону [To the Military Prosecutor of the 6^th Guard Army – Guard Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Comrade Nelson], undated. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, p. 121. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution.

[10] “Военному прокурору 6-й гвардейской армии – гвардии подполковнику июстиции тов. Нельсону [To the Military Prosecutor of the 6^th Guard Army – Guard Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Comrade Nelson], undated. Fond K-1, Op. 45, File 1832, p. 123. Lietuvos TSR Valstybės Saugumo Komitetas [Lithuanian KGB] Selected Records, Hoover Institution.